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Abstract
The purpose of this Essay is to analyze the proposed new regime for the enforcement of
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, compared with the current situation under Regulation No. 17,
in the light of the four dimensions which have just been identified. The issue of timing of legal
intervention is discussed first. Indeed, the most important aspect of the proposed reform is the
abandonment of the current (pretence at) ex ante enforcement through prescreening and the move
to a pure system of ex post enforcement through deterrence. The following section looks at the role
of the competition authorities of the Member States (hereafter also called “national competition
authorities”) versus the European Commission. The proposed reform facilitates the enforcement
of Articles 81 and 82 EC by the national competition authorities, by removing the Commission’s
current monopoly for the application of Article 81(3), while providing for increased cooperation
among the competition authorities of the different Member States and the Commission within a
coherent network. The next section considers the role of private parties in the enforcement of
Articles 81 and 82 EC, and the role of national courts. The main change here is that the proposed
new regulation empowers national courts, when called upon to apply Article 81(1), to apply also
Article 81(3) themselves. The following section deals with sanctions, in respect of which no major
changes are proposed by the Commission. The final section contains a short conclusion.

THE MODERNIZATION OF THE
ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLES 81 AND 82
EC: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FOR A NEW
COUNCIL REGULATION REPLACING
REGULATION NO. 17
Wouter P.J. Wils*
INTRODUCTION
On September 27, 2000, the European Commission submitted to the Council a proposal for a new regulation, pursuant to
Article 83 of the EC Treaty1 , implementing Articles 81 and 82 of
the EC Treaty ("the proposed new regulation") .2
A. The Provisions of the EC Treaty
Article 81 (1) EC prohibits all agreements or concerted practices between undertakings that restrict competition within the
common market and affect trade between Member States, while
* Member of the Legal Service of the European Commission, Lecturer in European law and economics at Utrecht University. All views expressed are strictly personal
to the author, who is endebted to Giuliano Marenco, Richard Lyal, Eugenio de March,
Kirti Mehta, Emil Paulis, and Rfidiger Dohms for their various helpful comments and
contributions. This Essay is the result of a speech given at the Twenty-eighth Annual
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, sponsored by the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York, New York, U.S.A., Oct. 20, 2000.
1. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J.
C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporating
changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997,
O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"),
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and
renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
2. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations
(EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC)No 3975/87
("Regulation Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty") [hereinafter Proposed
New Regulation], COM(2000)582final, OJ C 365 E/284 (2000). This is the first time
that a Community regulation is proposed with both a full title and a short title, in
application of the Inter-institutional Agreement of 22 December 1998 on common
guidelines for the quality of drafting of Community legislation, O.J. C 73/1 (1999),
8.
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Article 81(3) allows for the prohibition to be declared inapplicable to any agreement or category of agreements that contribute
to improved production or distribution or promote technical or
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, provided that the restriction of competition is
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, and that the
agreement does not afford the undertakings concerned the possibility of substantially eliminating competition.3 Article 82 EC
prohibits, insofar as it may affect trade between Member States,
any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it.4
The Treaty itself does not set out how these prohibitions are
to be enforced.' Article 83 EC instead delegates to the Council,
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, the task to
lay down "the appropriate regulations or directives to give effect
to the principles set out in Articles 81 and 82."' The second
paragraph of Article 83 EC further indicates that these implementing regulations shall be designed "to ensure compliance
with the prohibitions laid down in Article 81 (1) and in Article 82
by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments"
and "to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article
81 (3), taking into account the need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to simplify administration to the
greatest possible extent on the other."7
B. Regulation No. 17
On the basis of Article 83 EC (then Article 87 of the E.E.C.
Treaty), the Council adopted in 1962 Regulation No. 17,8 which
has governed the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC ever
since. Articles 3, 15, and 16 of Regulation No. 17 empower the
Commission, where it finds that there is infringement of Article
3. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 81 (ex Article 85).
4. Id. art 82 (ex Article 86).
5. Apart from the word "prohibited" in both provisions, and Article 81(2), which
provides that "any agreements... prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void."
6. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 83 (ex Article 87).
7. Id.
8. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 87.
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81 or Article 82 EC, to require the undertakings concerned to
bring such infringement to an end, and to impose fines and periodic penalty payments.9 Article 2 allows the Commission, upon
application by the undertakings concerned, to issue negative
clearances, i.e., to certify that, on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no grounds under Article 81(1) or Article 82
EC for action on its part in respect of an agreement or practice. 10 As to the application of Article 81(3) EC, Article 4(1) of
Regulation No. 17 provides that agreements falling under Article
81 (1) EC, in respect of which the parties seek application of Article 81(3), must be notified to the Commission. 1 Article 6(1) of
the Regulation adds that exemption decisions pursuant to Article 81(3) cannot take effect at a date earlier than the date of
notification. 12 This condition of prior notification does not apply to agreements falling within Article 4(2) of the Regulation.
The latter provision initially covered only a few relatively unimportant types of agreements, but since 18 June 1999 it includes
all vertical agreements.' 3 Also for these agreements, however,
Article 9(1) of Regulation No. 17 provides that the Commission
has sole power to declare Article 81 (1) inapplicable pursuant to
Article 81(3) EC."4 According to Article 9(3) of the Regulation,
the competition authorities of the Member States are competent
to apply Article 81(1) and Article 82 EC (at least if empowered
to do so by their national laws), 1" but only as long as the Commission has not initiated a procedure regarding the same agreement or practice.' 6 Regulation No. 17 does not regulate the
powers of national courts. 1 7 The Court of Justice has however
held that the prohibitions of Articles 81(1) and 82 EC tend by
their very nature to produce direct effects in relations between
individuals, and that these Articles thus create direct rights with
9. Id. arts. 3, 15, & 16.
10. Id. art. 2.
11. Id. art. 4(1).
12. Id. art. 6(1).
13. Council Regulation No. 1216/99, amending Regulation No. 17/99, O.J. L 148/
5 (1999).
14. Council Regulation No. 17/62, art. 9(1).
15. In eight of the 15 Member States (namely Belgium, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), national law currently empowers national
competition authorities to apply Community competition law.
16. Council Regulation No. 17/62, art. 9(3).

17. Postbank v. Comm'n, Case T-353/94, [1996] E.C.R. 11-946 (CFI)

1

66.
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respect to the individuals concerned that the national courts
must safeguard.1 8
C. Main Difference Between the Proposed New Regulation and
Regulation No. 17
The main difference between the proposed new regulation
and Regulation No. 17 concerns the application of Article 81(3)
EC. In line with the White Paper that the Commission published in 1999 ("White Paper"), 9 the proposed new regulation
replaces the current notification and authorization system by a
directly applicable exception system.2 0 Apart from this central
point, a number of other changes are proposed, not all of which
are discussed in this paper. l
D. FundamentalDimensions of Law Enforcement this Essay

Outline of

In his 1993 article on the optimal structure of law enforcement,2 2 Professor Shavell distinguishes three basic dimensions
according to which methods of law enforcement can differ. The
first dimension is the timing of legal intervention. Intervention
may take place before an undesirable act is committed. Alternatively, legal intervention may come about after the act has been
committed, or after harm has occurred. The second dimension
of legal intervention is the form of the sanctions, the main
choice being between monetary sanctions and imprisonment.
18. BRT v. SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 62 (C.J.), 1 16.
19. See White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and
86 of the EC Treaty, OJ.C 132/1 (1999) [hereinafter White Paper].
20. See id.
79-81. The White Paper suggested an exception for partial-function
production joint ventures, to which the notification procedures of the EC Merger Regulation (see infra note 24), would be extended. The proposed new regulation does not
provide for this exception. According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying
the proposed new regulation, this question "will be further examined in the context of
the forthcoming reflections on the revision of [the EC Merger Regulation]." Proposed
New Regulation, supra note 2.
21. The most important points not dealt with in this paper are the proposal concerning the relationship between Articles 81 and 82 and national competition laws (Article 3 of the proposed new regulation) and the proposal to give the Commission the
power, subject to judicial authorisation, to carry out inspections (the proposed new
regulation no longer uses the somewhat bizarre word "verifications" used in Regulation
No. 17) at the homes of directors, managers, and other staff of undertakings (Articles
20(2) (b) and 20(7) of the proposed new regulation).
22. S. Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36J.L. & EcoN. 255 (1993).
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The third dimension relates to the role of private parties versus
public agents in enforcement. In a federal or quasi-federal context a fourth dimension may be added concerning the role of
central versus local enforcement agents.
The purpose of this Essay is to analyse the proposed new
regime for the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC, compared
with the current situation under Regulation No. 17, in the light
of the four dimensions which have just been identified.
The issue of timing of legal intervention is discussed first.
Indeed, the most important aspect of the proposed reform is the
abandonment of the current (pretence at) ex ante enforcement
through prescreening and the move to a pure system of ex post
enforcement through deterrence. The following section looks
at the role of the competition authorities of the Member States
(hereafter also called "national competition authorities") versus
the European Commission. The proposed reform facilitates the
enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC by the national competition authorities, by removing the Commission's current monopoly for the application of Article 81(3), while providing for increased cooperation among the competition authorities of the
different Member States and the Commission within a coherent
network. The next section considers the role of private parties
in the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC, and the role of
national courts. The main change here is that the proposed new
regulation empowers national courts, when called upon to apply
Article 81 (1), to apply also Article 81(3) themselves. The following section deals with sanctions, in respect of which no major
changes are proposed by the Commission. The final section
contains a short conclusion.
I. THE TIMING OF LEGAL INTERVENTION: EX ANTE
ENFORCEMENT THROUGH PRESCREENING
OR EX POST ENFORCEMENT THROUGH DETERRENCE?
A. The Two Alternatives and the Current Situation
1. Two Methods of Enforcement
As to the timing of legal intervention, the legislator has a
basic choice between two methods to enforce substantive rules,2 3
23. The term "substantive rule" is used here to refer to the underlying material
content of the legal rules. For instance, legally speaking, the EC Merger Regulation
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such as the prohibition of agreements, which appreciably restrict
competition without redeeming virtue (Article 81 EC), the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position (Article 82 EC) or the
prohibition of concentrations, which create or strengthen a
dominant position (EC Merger Regulation) :24 ex ante enforcement through prescreening or ex post enforcement through deterrence.
Ex ante enforcement through prescreening means that,
when an undertaking contemplates a merger or acquisition that
may create a dominant position, a contract that may appreciably
restrict competition without having any redeeming virtue, or
some commercial behaviour which may constitute an abuse of a
dominant position, a decision is taken in advance on the lawfulness of the contemplated action. Under the alternative method
of ex post enforcement through deterrence, no enforcement action is taken in advance. The undertaking is left alone to decide
whether it commits the contemplated action, but it is induced to
respect the substantive rule by the threat of a sanction being imposed afterwards in case of violation.
Some combination of both methods could be imagined.
One possibility is optional or voluntary prescreening, leaving the
undertaking the choice whether or not to submit its proposed
action for prescreening, combined with ex post enforcement
through deterrence for those actions which are not submitted
for prescreening.
2. The Current Situation
a. Merger Control
The EC Merger Regulation is a clear example of ex ante
its system of mandatory
enforcement through prescreening:
decision within strict
and
final
suspension
notification,
prior
does not itself contain a prohibition of concentrations that create or strengthen a dominant position. Instead, it contains an obligation to notify proposed concentrations and
a prohibition to put them into effect before notification, during the Commission procedure and thereafter if the procedure results in a decision finding that the concentration will create or strengthen a dominant position. These obligations are the reflection
of the choice of an enforcement system based on mandatory prior notification and
advance clearance. As the purpose here is precisely to analyse such procedural choices,
we rather start from the underlying substantive rule.
24. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, Oj. L 257/13 (1990), amended by
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1301/97, O.J. L 180/1 (1997).
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time limits ensures that the question of the legality of a proposed
concentration is normally settled definitively before the concentration is put into effect.
b. Article 82
On the other hand, Article 82 EC is almost entirely enforced ex post through deterrence. It is true that Article 2 of
Regulation No 17 provides for a possibility of negative clearance:
upon application by the undertakings concerned, the Commission may certify that, on the basis of the facts in its possession,
there are no grounds under Article 81 for action on its part in
respect of an agreement, decision, or practice. There is however
no obligation for undertakings, which hold or may hold a dominant position, to request such negative clearance for any act or
behaviour that may be abusive. A request for negative clearance
does not have any suspensive effect, and the Commission is not
bound by any time limit for adopting its decision. The Commission is not even obliged to take a decision, having wide discretion to refuse to deal with cases that lack sufficient Community
interest. 25 A negative clearance decision does not definitively
settle the question of legality under Article 82 either. Since it
only certifies that, on the basis of the facts in the Commission's
possession, there are no grounds for action on the Commission's
part, the Commission could later reassess the case in the light of
new facts, whereas national courts and the competition authorities of the Member States remain free to apply Article 82 according to their own judgment. In practice undertakings that hold
or may hold a dominant position rarely request a negative clearance before adopting some behaviour that could possibly be
abusive. They rather decide whether or not to adopt the contemplated behaviour taking into account the threat of fines inflicted by the Commission or national competition authorities or
damages awarded by national courts when a violation of Article
82 is later found.
c. Article 81
As to Article 81 EC, Regulation No. 17 provides for a hybrid
system of optional prescreening at the undertakings' choice,
combined with ex post enforcement through deterrence.
25. See Automec v. Comm'n, T-24/90, 1992 E.C.R. II 2250 (CFI),
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There is no obligation to notify agreements that fall or may
fall under Article 81(1) to the Commission. Just as for Article
82, there is a possibility to ask for negative clearance, i.e., a certification by the Commission that on the basis of the facts in its
possession, there are no grounds for it to intervene under Article 81 (1), but the Commission may decline to deal with the case,
and a negative clearance decision has only limited value.
A distinction has to be made between agreements referred
to in Article 4(2) of Regulation No. 17, which since June 13,
1999 include most prominently vertical agreements, 26 and all
other agreements.
For the latter the situation is the following: If an agreement
falls under Article 81(1) EC, and is not covered by a block exemption regulation, the parties to it must notify the Commission
of the agreement if they want to obtain an exemption under Article 81(3). The Commission has an obligation to adopt a decision, either granting or refusing the exemption, depending on
is
whether the conditions of Article 81(3) are fulfilled, but there 27
no fixed time limit within which the decision has to be taken.
In practice, many exemption decisions are never taken, the notifying parties accepting an informal "comfort letter" indicating
that the agreement appears to fulfill the conditions for exemption. A formal exemption decision will then only be taken if and
when, at some later point in time, the parties insist on obtaining
one, typically because their agreement is contested before a national court. Subject to judicial review by the Community
Courts, an exemption decision is binding upon national courts
and competition authorities. However, exemption decisions are
only valid for a specified period, 28 after which a renewal can only
be granted upon new notification.
26. See Council Regulation No. 1216/1999, art. 4, O.J. L 148/5 (1999) (defining
vertical agreements as those "agreements... entered into by two or more undertakings,
each operating, for the purposes of the agreement, at a different level of the production or distribution chain, and [relating] to the conditions under which the parties may
purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services").
27. According to the case law, the decision must be taken within a reasonable period. In Dutch cranes (SCK and FNK v. Comm'n, T-213/95 and T-18/96, 1997 E.C.R. II
1746), the Court of First Instance held that, in the circumstances of the specific case, 46
months was a reasonable period.
28. Of the 19 exemption decisions adopted by the Commission from 1993 to the
end of 1997, six specified a duration of five years, eight a duration of 10 years, two seven
years, two around 13 years, and one 30 years. One of the 10-year exemptions was a
renewal of an earlier exemption of the same duration.
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Crucial is that the starting date of the exemption cannot be
earlier than the date of notification. Given that agreements that
fall under Article 81 (1) and do not benefit from an exemption
are void pursuant to Article 81(2) EC, this creates an incentive
for the parties to notify the Commission of their agreement
before they put it into effect, at least if they care about the enforceability of the agreement and can reasonably believe that it
fulfills the substantive conditions of Article 81(3).
As to ex post enforcement, fines can be imposed by the
Commission or by national competition authorities and damages
can be awarded by national courts when violations of Article 81
are found.2 9 If an agreement has been notified to the Commission in order to seek exemption under Article 81(3), no fines
can be imposed for the period from the notification until the
decision granting or rejecting the exemption. This is, however,
unlikely to create a significant incentive for parties to notify the
Commission of their agreements before they put them into effect, because the Commission's constant practice is to impose
fines only for clear-cut violations of Article 81, and if such a clear
case were ever notified, the Commission would no doubt make
use of Article 15(6) of Regulation No. 17, which empowers it to
put an end to the immunity from fines by informing the undertakings concerned that after a preliminary examination it is of
the opinion that the agreement falls under Article 81(1) and
does not fulfill the conditions of Article 81(3).
If one looks at how the system works in practice, it appears
that not much real ex ante enforcement through prescreening
takes place: Only a limited number of agreements are notified
to the Commission nowadays. For the last five years (1995 to
1999), the average was 233 per year. There exist no doubt far
more agreements which the undertakings concerned choose not
to notify. 30 As to the agreements that are notified, the Commission's decision on their legality often comes years after the
agreement was put into effect. As a mechanism of ex ante enforcement through prescreening, the notification system under
Regulation No. 17 is thus more pretence than reality.
29. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (referring to national competition
authorities); see infra Part II.B & C (referring to national courts).
30. See also C. Ehlermann, The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 537, 546 (2000).
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For vertical agreements and other agreements referred to in
Article 4(2) of Regulation No. 17, the rule that the starting date
of the exemption cannot be earlier than the date of notification
does not apply any more since June 18, 1999. There is thus no
need for undertakings to notify the Commission of their agreements before they are put into effect so as to preserve their civil
enforceability. The practical result is that enforcement is entirely ex post. The Commission will only be asked to exercise its
exclusive competence to grant exemptions pursuant to Article
81(3) when the issue arises in civil litigation before national
courts.
B. Which Enforcement Method is Best Suited?
1. Criteria for Choosing Between the Two
Enforcement Methods
Ex ante enforcement through prescreening would function
perfectly (in the sense that it would guarantee full respect of the
substantive rule at no cost) if (1) the authority that takes the
prescreening decision distinguishes without error between those
contemplated actions which will turn out to violate the substantive rule and those which do not, (2) the prescreening procedure is costless (for the parties concerned and the taxpayer) and
fast, (3) the prescreening decisions are binding and final in that
the undertaking abides by them and that they settle once and for
all the question of the legality of the action, and (4) all proposed
actions likely to violate the substantive rule are submitted to the
prescreening procedure.
Conversely, ex post enforcement through deterrence works
perfectly if (1) the undertaking 3' knows with certainty whether
31. Under Regulation No. 17 only undertakings can be fined for violating Articles
81 and 82 EC, not individual decision-makers (unless in the case of single traders or
professionals who have not incorporated their business, as the undertaking then coincides with the natural person; the persons referred to in Article 3(1) (b) of the EC
Merger Regulation are in a comparable situation). The proposed new regulation does
not alter this situation. See infra note 155 and accompanying text. This creates an additional condition for perfect deterrence, namely the presence of adequate incentives
within the undertaking for the individual decision-makers. See A. Polinsky & S. Shavell,
Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239 (1993); G. Werden & M. Simon, Why Price-Fixers
Should Go to Prison, ANTITRUST BULL. 917 (1987); W. Wils, The Undertaking as Subject of EC
Competition Law and the Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons, 25 EUR. L.
REv. 99 (2000).
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the action it contemplates violates the substantive rule, (2) there
is certainty of detection, prosecution, and imposition of a sanction in case of violation, and certainty that no sanction will be
imposed in case of non-violation, (3) detection, prosecution,
and imposition of the sanction are costless (again both for the
parties concerned and the taxpayer), and (4) the cost of the
sanction to the undertaking exceeds its expected benefit of the
action.
In the real world, the above listed conditions for either enforcement method to function perfectly are rarely, if ever, met,
at least not fully, or not all of them simultaneously. The interest
of such lists is precisely to identify the possible sources of
problems that cause either the enforcement mechanism to be
inadequate, in the sense that respect of the substantive rule is
not guaranteed or only at high cost. In an earlier article, I systematically examined each of the conditions and possible
problems. 2 From this analysis it can be concluded that four factors should guide the choice between ex ante enforcement
through prescreening or ex post enforcement through deterrence for a given substantive rule: (1) credibility of deterrence,
(2) relative knowledge and predictability of the substantive rule,
(3) enforcement costs, and (4) the problems of adverse selection
and distortion of enforcement priorities under voluntary
prescreening.
2. First Factor: Credibility of Deterrence
For ex post enforcement through deterrence to work, the
undertaking, when deciding whether or not to engage in some
action that violates the substantive rule, should be faced with an
expected sanction, which exceeds its expected benefit from the
violation. The expected sanction depends on the probability of
detection and punishment, and on the magnitude of the sanction imposed in case of detection and punishment. The magnitude of available sanctions is confined by natural limits (total
wealth for monetary sanctions, lifetime for imprisonment) as
well as by political or cultural limits. For those substantive rules
for which the politically or culturally acceptable sanctions are
relatively low compared to the potential benefits from violations
32. W. Wils, Notification, Clearance, and Exemption in EC Competition Law: An Economic Analysis, 24 EUR. L. REv. 139, 144-150 (1999).
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to the actors concerned, ex post enforcement through deterrence will thus not work.
a. Application to Merger Control
This first factor explains the choice for ex ante enforcement
through prescreening in the area of merger control, already
under the ECSC Treaty of 1951," 3 under the EC Merger Regulation, in the United States under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of
1976, 3 4 as well as in many other jurisdictions.3 5 It would appear
indeed that the problem of sufficiently high sanctions not being
available for deterrence to be credible may be acute in the case
of merger control. The expected benefit from concentrations,
in particular the most anticompetitive ones, can be very substantial. The threatened sanctions would thus also have to be very
substantial. 36 At the same time, the political or cultural ceiling
on possible sanctions is relatively low. Anticompetitive mergers
or acquisitions are not considered sufficiently objectionable by
public opinion to warrant highly deterrent sanctions, such as imprisonment of the responsible decision makers, certainly not in
Europe. Even in the United States, where imprisonment appears acceptable for price fixing or bid rigging, it does not appear to be so for anticompetitive mergers.
b. Application to Articles 81 and 82
The problem of deterrence not being credible is less important as a factor to choose between ex ante or ex post enforcement with regard to restrictive agreements and abuse of a dominant position than in the case of mergers. The expected benefits from violations may be lower. The political or cultural
33. Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
art. 66(1), 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty].
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a, 1311-1314 (2001). Preclearance approval or disapproval of
proposed mergers had already been proposed in 1913 by Senator Cummins: 49 Cong.
Rec. 4126 (1913).
35. Even in French law, where, under Article 38 of the relative d la libertg des prix et
de la concurrence, Law No. 86-1243 of Dec. 1 1986, the Minister can challenge at any time
a concentration which harms competition, the undertakings concerned have the option
of notifying their proposed concentration and obtaining a decision (express or implied) within strict deadlines. It also appears that the Minister has never exercised his
power under Article 38 to challenge a concentration until long after its consummation.
36. All the more since the difficulty and cost of ex post litigation will result in not
all violations being punished, so that sanctions must correspondingly exceed the expected benefit.
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ceiling of acceptable sanctions is almost certainly higher, however, as these violations appear to be more widely regarded as
deserving punishment. Deterrence may be difficult to achieve
for some specific types of violations, in particular price cartels,
which may be very profitable and are relatively easy to conceal,3"
but ex ante enforcement through prescreening cannot remedy
this situation, since the ease of concealment will make the enforcement of any obligation to submit to prescreening equally
unworkable.
3. Second Factor: Relative Knowledge and Predictability of
the Substantive Rule
The second factor determining whether either ex ante enforcement through prescreening or ex post enforcement
through deterrence is more suited for a given substantive rule
relates to the knowledge and predictability of the substantive
rule.
Under ex post enforcement, the undertaking, when deciding whether or not to engage in some action, has to assess itself,
with the help of its legal advisors, the legality of its action under
the substantive rule. For instance, when an undertaking with a
strong market position decides on its pricing policy, it has to assess whether the pricing may amount to an abuse of a dominant
position within the meaning of Article 82 EC. If the undertaking
is not able to assess correctly whether or not the action it envisages will violate the substantive rule, errors will occur in two
ways. On the one hand, the undertaking may end up committing
a violation unwittingly. On the other hand, it may decide to abstain from a wealth-generating action in the false belief that it
would be illegal.
Under ex ante enforcement, the prescreening authority has
to assess the legality of the proposed action. For instance, if Article 82 EC were enforced under a system of prior notification and
clearance by the European Commission, the Commission would
have to assess whether the proposed pricing policy would
amount to an abuse of a dominant position. If the prescreening
authority is not able to assess correctly whether or not the notified action will violate the substantive rule, errors will again occur both ways: violations may be cleared on the one hand, and
37. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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harmless wealth-enhancing actions prevented on the other
hand.
To decide whether ex ante or ex post enforcement is more
suited for a given substantive rule, one should thus try to find
out who is least likely to make errors in the advance assessment
of whether an undertaking's envisaged action will violate the
substantive rule: the undertaking itself, with its legal advisors, or
the enforcement authority.
a. Errors
Errors in the advance assessment (by the enforcement authority in the case of ex ante enforcement, by the undertaking in
the case of ex post enforcement) of whether an undertaking's
envisaged action will violate the substantive rule can be due to
two possible causes: limited access to information and neglect.
i. Limited Access to Information
The first possible cause of errors is incomplete access to the
relevant information. To make a correct assessment of the compatibility of an envisaged action with the substantive law, one
needs to know on the one hand what is precisely proscribed by
that law. On the other hand, information is needed about the
exact nature of the envisaged action, about the undertaking concerned, and about the markets in which it operates and in which
the envisaged action will produce its effects. In the example
used above, the advance assessment by either the undertaking
itself or the Commission as to whether the envisaged pricing policy amounts to an abuse of a dominant position contrary to Article 82 EC would require information about what precisely constitutes a dominant position and what type of pricing policies constitute abuse under that provision, as well as information about
what exactly the undertaking intends to do, what the characteristics of the market are and what exactly the undertaking's position is on the market.
As to information concerning the envisaged action, the undertaking concerned, and the relevant market conditions, it is
rather obvious that the undertaking itself will generally have better access to this information than the enforcement authority.
The informational disadvantage of the enforcement authority is
likely to be much more pronounced in the context of prescreen-
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ing than in the context of ex post investigations, because in the
former situation the authority must decide without the benefit of
the information generated by the action itself."
As to information about the law, the undertakings with their
legal advisors on the one hand and the enforcement authority
on the other hand should in principle have equal access. Indeed, both statutory provisions (treaty articles, regulations) and
case law are publicly available. The fact that the law may be formulated as a general standard rather than as detailed rules, 9
with Article 82 of the EC Treaty, does not really matter. As long
as the standard has not been transformed into more detailed
rules by authoritative court decisions, everyone is equally faced
with the task of interpretation on the basis of the underlying
conceptions. The fact that the law may change over time does
not lead to a different conclusion either. Assuming that such
changes reflect new events, evolving societal preferences, and
novel information, there is no reason to assume that the undertakings concerned and their counsel should have an informational disadvantage compared to an enforcement authority.
One can however imagine two special situations in which
the enforcement authority would have an informational advantage over the undertakings and their counsel concerning the
precise content of the law, which could provide an argument for
ex ante enforcement through prescreening. The first situation
is where an entirely novel, revolutionary law is introduced, which
goes against well-established conceptions and practices of the
business and legal communities. In the beginning, it may not be
realistic to rely on the undertakings' self-assessment under such
a new law, all the less if the law takes the form of a rather general
standard, thus requiring for its interpretation an understanding
of the underlying conceptions, which by assumption are foreign
to those undertakings and their counsel. In such a situation, an
enforcement authority dedicated to the new law and its underlying conceptions would have a clear informational advantage,
possibly justifying ex ante enforcement of the new law through
prescreening by that dedicated authority. Over time this infor38. See W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 690 (1994).
39. See L. Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L. J. 557
(1992) (describing the distinction between standards and rules).
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mational asymmetry will however disappear when the law and its
underlying conceptions get disseminated in the business and legal communities. Indeed, the operation of the prescreening
procedure constitutes itself a dissemination mechanism, in that
the undertakings and their counsel who notify their proposed
actions get educated by the authority in the process.
The second situation that one could imagine in which the
enforcement authority would have an informational advantage
over the undertakings and their counsel as to the precise content of the law is that where the law is not really a rule of law but
rather a tool for the enforcement authority to take discretionary
political decisions. If the content of the law depends on discretionary political decisions by the enforcement authority, this
would constitute an argument in favour of ex ante enforcement.
ii. Neglect
The second possible cause of errors in the advance assessment of whether an undertaking's envisaged action will violate
the substantive rule is neglect. Indeed, even with access- to all
relevant information, the enforcement authority (in the case of
ex ante enforcement) or the undertaking with its legal advisors
(in the case of ex post enforcement) may fail to make a correct
assessment, because of accident or neglect. Those who believe
in incentives and markets should assume that there is rather less
risk of errors through neglect in the case of self-assessment by
the undertakings and their counsel than in case of prescreening
by an enforcement authority, given that undertakings will have a
strong incentive not to make mistakes and that counsel operate
on competitive markets.
b. Uncertainty and Risk-Bearing Cost
In case of ex post enforcement through deterrence, undertakings support some risk-bearing cost to the extent that they are
uncertain about how the law will be applied to their action ex
post. For instance, an undertaking with a strong market position
may want to introduce some novel distribution system or
method, which will require a substantial investment, which will
only be recouped over many years. Even on the basis of all available legal and factual information, and with the help of the best
counsel it can hire, the undertaking may remain uncertain as to

2001]

ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLES 81 AND 82

1671

whether five or ten years later its action would turn out to violate
Articles 82 or 81 EC, with the risk that it would not be able to
recoup its investment. This uncertainty may make the investment less attractive. Does this constitute an argument against ex
post enforcement? I do not think so.
It might be inappropriate to let the undertakings shoulder
this competition law risk in a situation where the content of the
law would depend on discretionary political decisions, or where
existing information about the law would not be made publicly
available.
Provided however that the law is a real rule of law, and that
all existing information about its content is made publicly available, the competition law risk is not fundamentally different from
all other risks related to the investment. Indeed, the undertaking is likely to face many other risks, in particular market risks,
arising from uncertainty with regard to such factors as the level
of future demand, technological change, behaviour of competitors, and prices of inputs, but also risks relating to its own management and labour, and various other regulatory or legal
risks.4 °
As for all these other risks, it is generally best that the competition law risk is internalized by the undertaking itself. Indeed, the efficient level of investment is induced when investors
bear all real costs and benefits of their decisions.4 1 Insulating undertakings from real competition law risks would actually lead to
over investment. In the above example: if there is a real risk
that five or ten years from now the distribution method will turn
out to violate competition rules, the undertaking should fully
consider this risk in its decision. Indeed, assuming that competition law at each point in time adequately reflects societal preferences, there would be a real harm to society if this violation occurred, and this possible harm should be fully taken into account in the undertaking's investment decision.

40. See Ian Forrester, The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: Compatibility,
Efficiency, Legal Security, Paper presented at the Fifth EUI Competition Law and Policy
Workshop (June 2-3, 2000), at http://www.iue.it/RSC/competition/papers.htm.
41. L. Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,99 HARV. L. REv. 509, 529
(1986).
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c. Summing Up on the Second Factor
Ex post enforcement through deterrence is generally to be
preferred over ex ante enforcement through prescreening because undertakings, with the help of their legal advisors, can be
expected to make less errors in the advance assessment of their
action under the substantive rule than prescreening authorities,
in particular because undertakings have easier access to all relevant information. An argument in favour of ex ante enforcement could only be made in two special situations, where an entirely novel, revolutionary law is being imposed or where the
content of the law depends on discretionary, political decisions
of the enforcement authority. The fact that undertakings support risk-bearing costs due to uncertainty about the future application of the law does not constitute an argument against ex post
enforcement. Provided that the law is a real rule of law, and that
all existing information about its content is made publicly available, this risk-bearing cost reflects the efficient internalization of a
real cost in the undertakings' investment decisions.
d. Application to Merger Control
It could be argued that the problem of the prescreening
authority's difficulty in getting access to all relevant information
may be less serious with regard to mergers, because of the oneoff structural nature of the action to be controlled (as opposed
to the more continuing behavioural nature of the actions to be
controlled under the other competition rules). If the prescreening authority has sufficient powers to oblige the undertakings
42
concerned, as well as third parties, to answer factual questions,
the authority arguably does not have too serious an informa42. Under the EC Merger Regulation and its implementing rules, the European
Commission has such strong powers: The notification must include answers to a substantial number of factual questions contained in the notification form. If the information is found incomplete, the time limits for the Commission's decision and the corresponding suspension of the concentration only start running at the day of completion.
The Commission can during the procedure request all necessary information not only
from the notifying parties but also from third parties, if necessary under the threat of
fines and periodic penalty payments. The Commission also makes a public announcement when it receives a notification, so as to invite interested third parties to come
forward with relevant information. Finally, the Commission may later revoke its decision authorizing the concentration if the decision was based on incorrect information
for which one of the undertakings concerned is responsible or where it has been obtained by deceit. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, O.J. L 257/13 (1990).
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tional disadvantage, given that most if not all relevant information appears to be objectively verifiable and not easy to conceal.
e. Application to Articles 81 and 82
Conversely, the informational deficit of the prescreening
authority is likely to be worse in the case of Articles 81 and 82
than for mergers, because of the more continuing behavioural
nature of the actions to be controlled. Ex ante enforcement
would thus generally not be a good option.
The historical choice for a notification system in Regulation
No. 17 with regard to Article 81 can however be understood by
reference to the two special situations identified above in which
the enforcement authority could have an informational advantage over the undertakings and their counsel concerning the
precise content of the law, possibly justifying ex ante enforcement through prescreening.
i. Article 81 is No Longer Revolutionary Today
At the time Regulation No. 17 was adopted, the prohibition
on restrictive agreements was entirely revolutionary in Europe.
The prohibition on abuse of a dominant position, first in the
E.C.S.C. Treaty of 19514" and subsequently in Article 86 of the
E.E.C. Treaty of 1957 (now Article 82 EC), 4 4 was not without precedent: in Germany, for instance, an "Ordinance against the
Abuse of Economic Power" had been enacted in 1923. 45 On the
contrary, the prohibition on restrictive agreements first laid
down in Article 65 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty4 6 and then also in Article 85 of the E.E.C. Treaty (now Article 81 EC), 4 7 was "a fundamental innovation in Europe."4 Before the Second World War,
cartels were a wide-spread and highly esteemed institution
throughout Europe.4 9 The insertion of the prohibition on re43. ECSC Treaty, supra note 33.
44. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 82 (ex Article 86).
45. K. N6rr, Law and Market Organization: The HistoricalExperience in Germany From
1900 to the Law Against Restraints of Competition (1957), 151 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON./ZEITSCHRIFr FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFr 5, 10 (1995).
46. ECSC Treaty, supra note 33, art. 65.
47. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 81 (ex Article 85).
48. J. MONNET, M9MOIRES 413 (1976).
49. H. Schr6ter, Cartelizationand Decartelization in Europe, 1870-1995: Rise and Decline of an Economic Institution, 25 J. EUR. ECON. HIST. 129, 137.40 (1996) (noting that
Yugoslavia was the only European country where cartels were prohibited at that time).
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strictive agreements in European law, as well as around the same
time in German national law, was due to American influence, if
not pressure. 50 As an entirely new and revolutionary import, the
meaning of the prohibition on restrictive agreements must have
been rather unclear to most European business people and lawyers. In the early phase of the application of Article 81, this factor thus pleaded for ex ante enforcement.
The situation has however changed since. Article 81 is no
longer revolutionary today: after several decades of application,
European business people and lawyers have acculturated; virtually all Member States have now also adopted similar provisions
in their national laws. 5 ' The novel character of Article 81 can
thus no longer justify ex ante enforcement.
ii. Article 81(3) Does Not Depend on Discretionary
Political Decisions
At the time Regulation No. 17 was adopted, it may also have
been considered that the application of Article 81(3) depended
or should depend on discretionary political decisions. Indeed,
without the benefit of subsequent case law and practice, this
Treaty provision could have been read in two different ways.
Under the first reading, Article 81(3) is nothing but a codified
form of the American rule of reason. Indeed, Article 81 is the
52
European equivalent of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Whereas the latter reads as a single rule prohibiting all agreements in restraint of trade (similar to Article 81 (1)), it has been
interpreted by the courts as condemning only unreasonable re50. See MONNET, supra note 48, 356-7, 411-13; see also D. SPIERENBURG & R.
POIDEVIN, THE HISTORY OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL

COMMUNITY, 26-28 (1996); V. BERGHAHN, THE AMERICANIZATION OF WEST GERMAN INDUS-

TRY 1945-1973 (1986) (providing a detailed description of the strong resistance to be
overcome in Germany). In the national laws of other European countries, a similar
prohibition on restrictive agreements was introduced much later: for instance in the
Netherlands only in 1997.
51. The Central and Eastern European countries lining up for accession to the EU
have also already adopted similar national laws in preparation. Indeed, the Europe
Agreements between the EC and the accession candidates oblige these countries to
apply the principles of Articles 81 and 82 and to harmonize their national competition
law with EC competition law. See, e.g., Europe Agreement between the European Communities, and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the
other part, arts. 63 & 69, O.J. L 348/1 (1993).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001).
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straints."3 Article 81(3) simply codifies this case law. Under this
first reading, there is of course no scope for discretionary political decisions in the application of Article 81(3), the American
rule of reason being a true rule of law. Under the second reading, which could draw on the word "may"in the text of Article
81(3) ("The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of. . .")," the application of Article 81(3) would not be a right whenever the four conditions
listed therein are met, but rather depend on a discretionary political decision. In the perspective of this second reading, an argument could be made in favour of ex ante enforcement.
There can be no doubt any more today that the first reading
is the right one. In almost 40 years of application of Regulation
No. 17, the Commission has never refused an exemption when
the four conditions of Article 81 (3) were met, nor has it granted
an exemption for other reasons than the fulfilment of those conditions. 5 As to the Community Courts, the underlying conception of the case law is that fulfilment of the conditions entitles an
undertaking to the benefit of Article 81(3).56 Notwithstanding
the Courts' declarations as to the "margin of discretion" which
the Commission would enjoy in the "complex economic appraisals" it makes under Article 81 (3) ,7 the case law shows how punctiliously the Courts control the assessment made by the Commission in accepting or refusing the fulfilment of a condition.5" In
French, the working language of the Courts, the Courts have
53. See, e.g., Standard Oil v United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
54. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 81(3) (ex Article 85).
55. G. Marenco, Does a Legal Exception System Require an Amendment of the
Treaty?, Paper presented at the Fifth EUI Competition Law and Policy Workshop (June
2-3, 2000), at http://www.iue.it/RSC/competition/papers.htm.
85, the Court of First In56. In Matra v Comm'n, T-17/93, 1994 E.C.R. 11-595,
stance considered that "in principle, no anticompetitive practice can exist which,
whatever the extent of its effects on a given market, cannot be exempted, provided that
all the conditions laid down in Article 81(3) of the Treaty are satisfied and that the
practice in question has been properly notified to the Commission."
57. Metro v. Comm'n, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875 (CJ.), 45, 50; CB and
109.
Europay v. Comm'n, Cases T-39/92 and T-40/92, 1994 E.C.R. 11-49 (CFI),
58. See Marenco, supra note 55; S. Kon, Article 85, Para. 3: A Casefor Application by
National Courts, 19 CML REv. 541 (1982); contra R. Wesseling, The Commission White Paper on Modernisationof E.C. Antitrust Law: Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment
of Alternative Options, E.C.L.R. 420 (1999), who seems to overlook the reality of the Commission's decisional practice and of the judicial review exercised by the Community
Courts when he claims that "the ECJ has repeatedly endorsed Commission decisions
which took into account non-competition concerns when determining whether an
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never used the term "marge de discrgtion" but instead "marge
d'appreciation," suggesting no more than a margin of economic
assessment. Such margin exists equally in the application of Article 81 (1), 5 or Article 82, as they require equally complex economic assessments. This is not a political discretion, and it can
thus not support an argument for ex ante enforcement.
4. Third factor: Enforcement Costs
The third factor determining whether ex ante enforcement
through prescreening or ex post enforcement through deterrence is more suited for a given substantive rule relates to enforcement costs. The relevant measure is the overall social cost,
including the costs borne by the undertaking, the decision-making authority and any other third parties involved. The cost of
prescreening one proposed action can generally be expected to
be lower than the cost of the ex post prosecution or litigation of
one action." Prescreening will, however, involve a much higher
number of cases. Ex post enforcement can in principle be limited to those cases that have turned out to be violations of the
substantive legal rule, 6 1 whereas prescreening will inevitably
cover a much wider group of proposed actions. Under ex post
enforcement there will of course also be the cost of self-assessment by the undertakings concerned. This cost is however likely
agreement fulfilled all four conditions" and that "there is a large degree of administrative, or policy discretion involved in the implementation of Article 81 (3)."
59. Remia v Comm'n, Case 42/84, 1985 E.C.R. 2566 (Cj.), 34; BAT and Reynolds
v. Comm'n, Cases 142 and 156/84, 1987 E.C.R. 4487 (C.J.), 62,; Bagnasco, Cases C-215/
96 and C-216/96, 1999 E.C.R. 1-179 (Cj.), 50.
60. There are three reasons for this: First, more information will be available ex
post and this is likely to make the administrative or legal procedures more lengthy and
complex and thus more costly. Second, the stakes are likely to be higher in an ex post
procedure. In the prescreening procedure, the undertaking has the expected benefit
from its proposed action at stake, whereas in an ex post procedure its stake lies in
avoiding the sanction being imposed on it. Deterrence requires that this sanction exceed the expected benefit, to an extent inversely related to the probability of detection
and punishment. Where the stakes are higher, more will be spent on legal and expert
help. Finally, it may be easier to limit through procedural rules, in particular deadlines,
the excess provision of legal and expert arguments in a prescreening procedure because of the need for the procedure to be fast. The first and second of these reasons are
variations on those identified. See W. Landes & R. Posner, supra note 38, at 692 (providing analysis focused on tort-like situations). On the problem of excessive spending on
litigation, see S. Shavell, The FundamentalDivergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 608-611 (1997).
61. Or even to a fraction of these cases if the sanction can be increased by the
corresponding multiple.

20011

ENFORCEMENT OFARTICLES 81 AMD 82

1677

to be lower than the overall cost (borne by the undertaking, the
authority, and possibly involved third parties) in case of
prescreening, because there is no need to convince a no doubt
critical authority, which may want to cross-check the facts as
presented to it by the undertaking requesting the clearance.
a. Application to Merger Control
In comparing the suitability of ex ante or ex post control for
mergers, enforcement cost considerations do not appear to go
decisively either way. Ex post litigation is likely to be expensive
(indirectly because of the possible substantial benefits of concentrations, via the resulting high sanctions and correspondingly
high stakes in the litigation), but ex ante enforcement is also
costly, in particular because of the amount of information to be
provided in the notification (necessary so as to overcome the
prescreening authority's informational disadvantage). It appears feasible, however, to define with reasonable precision and
without excessive over-inclusivity the group of proposed actions
which have to be submitted for prescreening.
b. Application to Articles 81 and 82
In the case of Articles 81 and 82, enforcement cost considerations clearly go against generalised ex ante enforcement. The
problem is that the numbers of contracts and business decisions
that would have to be notified and prescreened in a pure system
of ex ante enforcement would be immense: to be sure to catch
all potential violations of Articles 81 and 82, an enormous number of contracts, board decisions, and actions taken by the leading officers of companies of some size would have to be
screened.
The authors of Regulation No. 17 must have been aware of
the risk of a huge number of notifications, and the resulting impossibility for the Commission to deal with them swiftly. Indeed,
no time limit was provided for the Commission's decision:6 2 the
undertakings are free to implement the notified agreement and
when the Commission later adopts an exemption decision, this
decision can have retroactive effect back to the date of notifica62. According to later case law, the decision must, however, be taken within a reasonable period. See supra note 27.
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tion." In the meantime the undertakings benefit from immunity from fines.6 4 These modalities made the notification system
much more manageable, but the price to be paid is that violations may go on undisturbed for quite some time.6 5
Those modalities that make the notification system manageable for the Commission, and thus reduce some of the administrative cost, do not however affect the number of notifications
made and the corresponding cost borne by the notifying parties.
In the first years of the application of Regulation No. 17, almost
40,000 agreements were notified to the Commission. From 1967
on, the Commission adopted a number of block exemption regulations, which exempt entire categories of agreements.6 6 The
cost of notifying these agreements is thus avoided. On the other
hand, a price may be paid: as block exemption regulations clear
entire categories of agreements defined in the abstract, errors
may be made in that certain agreements which would appear to
violate the substantive rule are exempted, upon individual analysis. For instance, from May 1, 1967 until May 31, 2000,67 all ex63. This retroactive effect was not provided for in the Commission's original proposal (document IV/COM(60)158 of 28 October 1960), it was introduced later during
the discussions in the Parliament and the Council by way of a compromise meant to
accommodate France, which had taken a position against ex ante enforcement, and
thus allowing the necessary agreement to be reached in the Council vote. See A. Deringer, Les regles de la concurrence au sein de la CE.E.- Analyse et commentaires des articles 85 d
94 du traite, 59 REVUE DU MARCH9 COMMUN 256, 261 (1963), and 69 Revue du Marche
Commun 245, 246 (1964).
64. So-called "old agreements," i.e., agreements that were already in existence on
February 22, 1962, the date of entry into force of Regulation No. 17, provided that they
were notified to the Commission before November 1, 1962, and even benefited from
provisional validity.
65. For the most extreme cases of blatant violations being notified and consequently immunized from fines until the day the Commission deals with the notification,
a possibility of withdrawal of immunity was provided for in Article 15(6) of Regulation
No. 17. An admittedly not representative example of an agreement that was notified to
the Commission in 1962 and has been implemented until 1998 without its legality having been settled is the industry-wide agreement governing retail prices for books in the
Netherlands. See KVBBB v. Free Record Shop, Case C-39/96, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2303 (Cj.).
66. Over the years, block exemption regulations were adopted for exclusive distribution agreements, exclusive purchase agreements, motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, franchising agreements, technology transfer agreements, specialization agreements, research and development agreements, as well as for certain types of
agreements in the insurance and transport sectors.
67. The former date is that of entry into force of Comm'n Regulation No. 67/67,
OJ.L 847/67 (1967). The latter is the date until which Comm'n Regulation (EEC) No.
1984/83, which succeeded Regulation No. 67/67, was prolonged by Article 12(1) of
Comm'n Regulation (EC) No. 2790/1999, O.J.L 336/21 (1999). By virtue of Article
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clusive purchase agreements were block exempted, irrespective
of the market power of the undertakings concerned.68
It should be recalled that, even outside the scope of the
block exemption regulations and of Article 4(2), Regulation No.
17 does not impose an obligation to notify agreements falling
under Article 81 (1) EC. Undertakings can thus avoid the cost of
notification by choosing not to notify. In practice many undertakings appear to make this choice. They will then however pay
a different price in that their agreement, if it is indeed found to
fall under Article 81 (1), will not be legally enforceable, even if it
meets the substantive conditions of Article 81(3).
5. Fourth Factor: Specific Problems with Voluntary
Prescreening: Adverse Selection and Distortion of
Enforcement Priorities
Specific problems arise when ex ante enforcement through
prescreening is not mandatory, but optional or voluntary, leaving undertakings the choice of whether or not to submit its proposed action for prescreening.
Rational undertakings will try and exploit the choice offered so as to get away with violations. For those actions that are
certain or quite likely to constitute violations but for which ex
post enforcement does not work, for instance because the
probability of detection is low or the threatened sanction is insufficiently high, the undertaking will have no reason to ask for
prescreening. On the other hand, the undertaking may have
nothing to lose, at least if it does not have to pay for prescreening, in submitting for prescreening actions that it is deterred
from taking at its own risk, because it knows that they are sufficiently likely to be detected and sanctioned as violations ex post.
There may be a chance that they get cleared ex ante, either just
by accident or, more importantly, because the prescreening authority has insufficient information ex ante to assess the action
correctly.
12(2), agreements already in force on May 31, 2000 continue to benefit from the exemption until December 31, 2001.
68. Block exemption regulations usually provide for a possibility to withdraw the
benefit of the exemption for an agreement that does not meet the substantive conditions of Article 81(3), but doing so is administratively costly, with the result that the
Commission used this power only once in more than thirty years. See Langnese-Iglo,
O.J. L 183/19 (1993) (Comm'n). Moreover, the withdrawal only affects the future.
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In a situation where the authority which deals with prescreening notifications is also responsible for the ex post enforcement
for those actions which are not submitted for prescreening, and
unless the authority has unlimited resources, the rational use by
the undertakings of their choice of whether or not to submit an
action for prescreening will also result in a distortion of the authority's enforcement priorities. Ideally, an enforcement authority should devote its resources in priority to the most serious
infringements. However these are precisely those not likely to
be voluntarily notified for prescreening. Unless the enforcement authority has the discretion not to deal with the prescreening notifications it receives, its enforcement priorities will thus
be distorted.
a. Application to Merger Control
Given that prescreening under the EC Merger Regulation is
not voluntary but mandatory, problems of adverse selection and
distortion of enforcement priorities do normally not arise.6 9
b. Application to Articles 81 and 82
To the contrary, adverse selection and distortion of enforcement priorities appear very serious problems indeed under Regulation No. 17.70
The most serious infringements of Article 81, price or market-sharing cartels, are never notified to the Commission. Nor
do undertakings ever request a negative clearance for the worst
abuses of a dominant position. The notifications that the Commission receives tend to reveal either no infringement at all or
only relatively minor problems. In almost four decades of application of Regulation No. 17 there have been only nine decisions
in which a notified agreement was prohibited without a complaint having been lodged against it.7 ' However, notification related work does consume about half of the resources of the parts
69. Some adverse selection could happen at the margin, to the extent that undertakings could structure a virtually identical operation as a joint venture falling under
the Merger Regulation or rather as some other agreement that falls outside.
70. The problem was already anticipated in 1961 by the Economic and Social
Committee in its Opinion of March 28, 1961 (one of its two conflicting opinions on the
draft Regulation No. 17), cited in White Paper, supra note 19, at 43.
71. White Paper, supra note 19, at 77.
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of the Commission's Directorate General for Competition not
dealing with mergers or state aid.
The problem cannot be solved by giving more resources to
the Directorate General for Competition, however desirable that
may otherwise be. Indeed, if more resources were available, notifications would be dealt with more swiftly, and this would make
notification more attractive to industry. Many agreements that
fall under Article 81 (1) and benefit neither from a block exemption nor from Article 4(2) of Regulation No. 17, while being
likely to meet the substantive conditions of Article 81 (3), are not
notified today, nothwithstanding the resulting unenforceability.
If the Commission provided a better prescreening service, more
of these agreements would be notified.
6. Conclusion as to Articles 81 and 82
The conclusion of the above is that ex ante enforcement
through prescreening is generally and thoroughly unsuited for
Articles 81 and 82. Deterrence may be difficult to achieve for
some types of violations, in particular price cartels, which may be
very profitable and are relatively easy to conceal, but ex ante enforcement through prescreening cannot remedy this situation,
since the ease of concealment will make the enforcement of any
obligation to submit to prescreening equally unworkable. On
the other hand, ex ante enforcement is likely to lead to more
errors than ex post enforcement because of the informational
disadvantages from which the prescreening authority suffers,
and it entails substantially higher enforcement costs. Voluntary
prescreening is to be avoided because of the problems of adverse
selection and distortion of enforcement priorities.
Nor can a system of voluntary notification be justified by any
need to protect investments against the risk of a future finding
of incompatibility with Articles 81 or 82. Indeed, provided that
all existing information about the content of these legal rules is
made publicly available and that they are not applied in an arbitrary way, this risk-bearing cost reflects the efficient internalization of a real cost in the undertakings' investment decisions.
If the choice for a (very hybrid) notification system at the
time of the adoption of Regulation No. 17 can be understood as
reflecting the revolutionary novel character of the prohibition of
restrictive agreements, as well as possibly a conception of Article
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81(3) as a tool for discretionary political decisions, these considerations are no longer relevant today.
This conclusion is confirmed by the relatively happy experience of the United States, where the prohibitions equivalent to
Articles 81 and 82 have always been enforced exclusively ex post
through deterrence, as well as by the fact that, before the publication of the White Paper,7 2 the enforcement regime under Regulation No. 17 has constantly been criticised precisely on 73those
aspects related to the (attempts at) ex ante enforcement.
C. The Proposed New Regulation
1. Clear Choice for Ex Post Enforcement
The proposed new regulation clearly opts for ex post enforcement for the whole of Articles 81 and 82. Indeed, Article 1
of the proposed new regulation clearly states that "agreements,
decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81 (1) of the
Treaty which do not satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3), and
the abuse of a dominant position referred to in Article 82, shall
be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required."7 4
The proposed new regulation does not provide any more
for any possibility to notify agreements to the Commission, nor
for exemption decisions. Applications for negative clearance are
also no longer provided for.
As for the transition to the new enforcement system, Article
35 of the proposed new regulation provides that notifications
and applications for negative clearance made under Regulation
No. 17 shall lapse as from the date of application of the new
regulation, and that the validity of individual exemption decisions adopted by the Commission under Regulation No. 17 shall
also come to an end no later than on that date.7 5
Finally, under the proposed new regulation the competition
authorities of the Member States are not allowed either to set up
or keep a prescreening mechanism for the application of Arti72. See White Paper, supra note 19.
73. See A.O. B. Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law, 32

C.M.L.R. 973 (1995); V.

KORAH,

EC

COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE

150-151 (6th ed.

1997); E. Tucker, Europe's Paper Mountain, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at 13.
74. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 1.
75. This transitional regime was announced in the White Paper, supra note 19,
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cles 81 and 82 EC. This follows from Article 1 cited above, as
well as from Article 5 of the proposed new regulation which provides that the competition authorities of the Member States
(only) "have the power in individual cases to apply the prohibition in Article 81 (1) of the Treaty where the conditions of Article 81(3) are not fulfilled, and the prohibition in Article 82. For
this purpose, acting on their own initiative or on a complaint,
they may take any decision requiring that an infringement be
brought to an end, adopting interim measures, accepting commitments or imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any
other penalty provided for in their national law. Where on the
basis of the information in their possession the conditions for
prohibition are not met they may likewise decide that there are
no grounds for action on their part."7 6
2. Block exemptions
If the proposed new regulation does away with all individual
exemption decisions, it keeps the instrument of block exemption regulations. 7
As explained above,7 8 block exemption regulations were initially adopted as a instrument to reduce the huge number of
notifications which the Commission could not handle administratively. This historical justification is of course no longer relevant under the proposed new enforcement regime, when notifications will no longer exist.
In the new context, block exemption regulations can however still be justified as a mechanism to save on enforcement
costs. Indeed, for any category of agreements (1) which are very
frequently concluded in business practice, (2) for which a full
76. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 5. As to national courts, see injfa
Part III.B & C.
77. Their adoption is even facilitated in that Article 28(1) of the proposed new
regulation gives the Commission a general power to adopt such regulations, following
the procedure set out further in Article 28, whereas currently the Commission has more
limited powers under Council Regulation No. 19/65 O.J. L 36/533 (1965) (Special
English Edition 1965-66, p. 35) modified by Council Regulation No. 1215/1999 O.J. L
148/1 (1999), Council Regulation No. 2821/71 O.J. L 285/46 (1971) (Special English
Edition 1971 - III, p. 1032), Council Regulation No. 3976/87 O.J. L 374/9 (1987),
Council Regulation No. 1534/91 O.J. L 143/1 (1991) and Council Regulation No. 479/
92 0.J. L 55/3 (1992), which would all be repealed by Article 41 of the proposed new
regulation.
78. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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individual assessment would, in the overwhelming majority of
cases, lead to the conclusion that the conditions of Article 81(3)
are fulfilled, and (3) which can be sufficiently clearly defined,
the cost saving at the level of self-assessment by the undertakings
when concluding these agreements as well as at the level of ex
post litigation is likely to outweigh the cost of adopting the block
exemption regulation.
This justification depends crucially on block exemption regulations being sufficiently well chosen and narrowly tailored so
as to cover only those types of restrictions for which a full individual assessment would indeed in the overwhelming majority of
cases lead to the conclusion that the conditions of Article 81(3)
are fulfilled. As already indicated above, 79 this has not always
been the case in the past, when the urge to get rid of unmanageably high numbers of notifications has led to excessively
generous block exemptions, such as the exemption for exclusive
purchase agreements irrespective of the market power of the undertakings concerned. The recent new block exemption for vertical agreements, with its 30% market share threshold, certainly
constitutes a major improvement in this respect.8" In the same
line, the opening up of the possibility, not only for the Commission, but also for the competition authorities of the Member
States to withdraw the benefit of block exemptions in individual
cases, as well as the possibility for the Commission to disallow the
block exemption regulation in a certain market, recently introduced for vertical agreements"' and generalized in Articles
29(2) and 30 of the proposed new regulation, should serve to
obviate the risk that too many undesirable agreements will be
exempted.
79. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
80. Comm'n Regulation No. 2790/1999 O.J. L 336/21 (1999).

This regulation

does not, however, affect the current block exemption for motor vehicle distribution

agreements (Comm'n Regulation No. 1475/95 O.J. L 145/25 (1995)), which expires
on September 30, 2002. According to Article 11(3) of the latter regulation, the Commission will draw up a report on its evaluation on or before 31 December 2000. Other
current block exemptions which have been heavily criticised in the literature are those
in the transport and insurance sectors; see A.O. R. Van den Bergh, Modern Industrial
Organisation Versus Old-fashioned European Competition Law, 2 ECLR 75, 79-81 (1996); M.
Faure & R. Van den Bergh, Restrictions of Competition on InsuranceMarkets and the Applicability of EC Antitrust Law, 48 KNKLOS 65 (1995).
81. Articles Ia and 7(2) of Regulation No. 19/65 as added by Article 1 (2) and (4) of
Council Regulation No 1215/1999 O.J. L 148/1 (1999) and Article 8 of Comm'n Regulation No. 2790/1999 O.J. L 336/21 (1999).
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3. Guidelines and Notices
In the White Paper, the Commission announced that it "intends to draw up more notices and guidelines to explain its policy and provide guidance for the application of the Community
competition rules by national authorities. ' 2
Over the decades of application of Regulation No. 17, the
Commission has published a number of notices, the earliest being the 1962 notice on exclusive dealing contracts with commercial agents, 3 and the most important being the notice on agreements of minor importance.8 4 As with the block exemption regulations, the main purpose of these notices appears to have been
to reduce the number of notifications to the Commission, by setting out which agreements in the opinion of the Commission do
not fall under Article 81(1). When the notification system is
abolished, the notices obviously lose this function.
Under the proposed new enforcement regime, notices or
guidelines can still serve two functions: First, they can be an instrument for the Commission, or a national competition authority, to set out publicly how it intends to make use of its
prosecutorial discretion, so as to guide the undertakings' behaviour accordingly.
Indeed, the Commission is entitled to apply different degrees of priority in dealing with the complaints submitted to it,
in particular on the basis of the concept of sufficient Community
interest.8 5 A fortiori, it can choose which cases to pursue at its
own initiative. The case law has also confirmed that "fines constitute an instrument of the Commission's competition policy,"
and that "it must thus be allowed a margin of discretion when
fixing their amount, in order that it may channel the conduct of
undertakings towards observance of the competition rules."8 6
82. See White Paper, supra note 19, at 86.
83. See O.J. 139/3921 (1962). This notice has recently been replaced by the guidelines on vertical restraints, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/verticalrestraints/guidelines.
84. Over the years, the Commission published four versions of this notice: O.J. C
64/1 (1970), O.J. C 313/3 (1977), O.J. C 231/2 (1986), and O.J. C 372/13 (1997).
Other notices were published concerning cooperation agreements (O.J. C 75/3 (1968),
corrected by OJ. C 84/14 (1968)), subcontracting agreements (O.J. C 1/2 (1979)),
and cooperative joint ventures (O.J. C 43/2 (1993)).
83-85.
85. Automec v. Comm'n, T-24/90, 1992 E.C.R. 11-2250 (CFI), at
59; Van
86. Martinelli v. Comm'n, Case T-150/89, 1995 E.C.R. Il-I 186 (CFI),
Megen Sports v. Comm'n, Case T-49/95, 1996 E.C.R. 11-1822 (CFI), at 53; Volkswagen
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Of course, the Commission could just exercise these margins of
discretion on a case by case basis, and let undertakings gradually
learn about its policy and adapt their conduct accordingly. The
result may however be reached more quickly and at lower cost
(especially for the undertakings trying to understand the Commission's policy) if the policy is announced through a notice or
guidelines.
Examples of notices that serve this function are the Commission notices on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in
cartel cases 8 7 and on the method of setting fines.8" The recent
guidelines on vertical restraints also partially serve this function,
especially the chapter on withdrawal and disapplication of the
block exemption regulation. 9 In the White Paper, the Commission announced that it will publish a notice clarifying the concept of sufficient Community interest, so that complainants can
more easily determine whether they would be better advised to
address their complaint to the Commission or rather at the national level. 90
The second function that guidelines or notices could still
serve is that of explaining the law. All the more now that the
Commission is giving up its exclusive competence to apply Article 81(3), there can be no doubt that giving authoritative interpretations of the law is the task of the Court ofJustice, together
with the Court of First Instance and in cooperation with the national courts. The Commission can however make a valuable
contribution by collecting, ordering, and disseminating available
information about the law, thus reducing the cost, and enhancing the accuracy of the self-assessment by undertakings, and of
ex post enforcement proceedings. The recent guidelines on vertical restraints9 1 constitute a good example. Drawn up on the
basis of wide consultations involving competition experts from
the Member States (as well as the Community's partners in the
v. Comm'n, Case T-62/98, Judgment of 6July 2000, not yet published in E.C.R. (CFI),
335.
87. O.J. C 207/4 (1996); see also W. Wils, The Commission Notice on the Non-Imposition
or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 22 E. L. REv. 125
(1997).
88. OJ. C 9/3 (1998); see also W. Wils, The Commission's New Method for Calculating
Fines in Antitrust Cases, 23 E. L. REv. 252 (1998).
71-87.
89. OJ. 139/3921 (1962), supra note 83,
119.
90. See White Paper, supra note 19, at
91. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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European Economic Area), industry, and the legal profession,
they present in a readily accessible form current general understanding of the European law on vertical restraints. The Commission notice on the definition of relevant markets for the purposes of Community competition law9 2 can be considered similarly useful.
4. Non-infringement Decisions
Article 10 of the proposed new regulation empowers the
Commission to adopt decisions in which it finds that, on the basis of the information in its possession, Articles 81 or 82 do not
apply to a certain agreement or practice.9 3 The Commission can
only take such decisions "for reasons of the Community public
interest," and "acting on its own initiative." As explained in recital 13 of the proposed new regulation and in the White Paper,
these non-infringement decisions will only be taken in exceptional cases, where a transaction raises a new question. They
legal
would be of a declaratory nature, and would have the same
94
present.
at
have
decisions
clearance
effect as negative
The idea is thus certainly not to introduce a new system of
voluntary notification for prescreening. Indeed, non-infringement decisions cannot be taken upon application of the undertakings concerned. Moreover, contrary to the exemption decisions under Regulation No. 17, they are not of a constitutive but
only of a declaratory nature. Thus, they do not immunize
against later findings of infringement by national courts or national competition authorities,9 5 or even by the Commission itself if circumstances have changed or new information becomes
available.
Within a system based on ex post enforcement, the justification for such non-infringement decisions may again be one of
efficient dissemination of information about the law. Imagine
that the Commission, either on the basis of a complaint or on
the basis of its own suspicions of violation of Articles 81 or 82,
92. O.J. C 372/3 (1997).
93. As to Article 81, this may be either because the conditions of Article 81 (1) are
not fulfilled, or because those of Article 81 (3) are met.
94. See White Paper, supra note 19, 11 88-89.
95. Article 16 of the proposed new regulation does however require national
courts and competition authorities to give deference to Commission decisions. See infra
note 153 accompanying text.
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has opened an investigation against an agreement of practice.
At the end of the investigation, the Commission may find out
that upon thorough analysis the agreement or practice does not
violate those provisions, and that the file can thus be closed. It
will have to inform the undertaking or undertakings concerned
of this closure, which can be done by simple letter. If the opening of the investigation had been made public, a press release
may also be indicated to reverse the earlier publicity. In the
overwhelming majority of cases the precise reasons why the
agreement or practice was found not to constitute a violation
would be factual and case specific. Writing the reasoning down
in a decision would thus not serve any purpose. In those exceptional cases however where a new question is raised, for which
there are no precedents in the case law, which has also not been
dealt with in guidelines, and which is likely to come up in other
cases in the future, the cost of drafting and publishing a reasoned decision could be outweighed by the benefit in terms of
reduction of the cost and increase in the accuracy of the selfassessment by undertakings and of ex post enforcement proceedings in future other cases.
5. Reasoned Opinions
In the explanatory memorandum accompanying its proposal for the new regulation, the Commission announces that it:
[W]ill remain open to discuss specific cases with the undertakings where appropriate. In particular, it will provide guidance regarding agreements, decisions or concerted practices that raise an unresolved, genuinely new question of interpretation. To that effect, the Commission will publish a
notice in which it will set out the conditions under which it
may issue reasoned opinions. Any such system of opinions
must not, however, lead to companies being entitled to obtain an opinion, as this would reintroduce a kind of notification system."
As explained above,9 7 advance assessment of the legality of
envisaged actions should in principle be left to the undertakings
themselves, with the help of their legal advisors. The Commission should not be involved for at least three reasons: First,
96. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, Explanatory Memorandum.
97. See supra Part I.B.3.c.
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whenever it comes to applying the law to the specific agreement
or practice, envisaged by the undertakings concerned in the
markets in which they operate, the Commission will inevitably
suffer from an informational disadvantage. Second, whereas the
Commission, like any enforcement authority, should as a matter
of priority devote its limited resources to the most serious infringements, the agreements and practices on which it will be
asked to give its advance opinion will never fall in that category.
Third, the efficient level of investment being that induced when
investors bear all real costs and benefits of their decisions, the
cost of ensuring compliance with competition law should be
borne by the undertaking itself.
Any role for the Commission could only be justified by considerations of efficient dissemination of information about the
law, in line with the justifications for guidelines and non-infringement decisions given above.
For the Commission to publish a reasoned opinion could be
justified by considerations of efficient dissemination of information about the law if (1) the opinion only deals with abstract
questions of interpretation of the law, not the application to the
agreement or practice which the undertaking which submitted
the question to the Commission is considering, (2) the question
is one not dealt with in the case law or in guidelines, (3) the
question is one that the Commission can provide information on
without spending many resources, and (4) the question is likely
to be of importance for the assessment of a considerable number of other agreements and practices in the future, for which
the reasoned opinion would substantially decrease the cost or
increase the accuracy at the level of the self-assessment by the
undertakings concerned and at the level of ex post enforcement
proceedings.
6. Register of Restrictive Agreements
Finally, Article 4(2) of the proposed new regulation would
empower the Commission to introduce a registration obligation
for types of agreements, decisions, or practices caught by Article
81(1). The detailed provisions, including possible sanctions for
non-compliance with the registration obligation, are to be determined in a Commission regulation. The proposed article does
however state that the registration of an agreement or practice
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shall confer no entitlement on the registering undertakings, and
does not stand in the way of possible prohibition or fining decisions.
The idea does not originate with the Commission, but was
launched, in the course of the discussions following the publication of the White Paper, by Dr. B6ge, the president of the
Bundeskartellamt, the German competition authority. 9 8 The objective is to enhance the effectiveness of ex post enforcement by
creating transparency as to the existence of restrictive agreements and thus facilitating ex officio proceedings by the Commission and national competition authorities, complaints by
third parties before these authorities, as well as private enforcement. The proposal is inspired by a provision in the German Act
on Restraints of Competition, which requires registration of certain types of joint purchasing agreements between small and medium-sized enterprises which benefit from a legal exception to
the cartel prohibition.99
It is certainly right that the effectiveness of ex post enforcement through deterrence crucially depends on the ability of the
enforcement authorities or private complainants to detect infringements. Measures that facilitate the detection of infringements, without this benefit being outweighed by excessive administrative cost or other perverse effects, should thus certainly
be welcomed.
The crucial question is however whether a registration obligation could be devised which really facilitates the detection of
infringements without excessive administrative cost or other perverse effects. A registration obligation will certainly not facilitate
the detection of the most serious (hard core) infringements of
Article 81, such as price cartels, which will never be registered,
even if the registration obligation is backed up with the threat of
a fine.'
The register could thus only be helpful for the detection of non-hard-core infringements. This raises a double problem. The first problem is that non-hard-core infringements can
typically not be established on the mere basis of the content or
98. U. B6ge, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, Paper presented at the
Fifth EUI Competition Law and Policy Workshop (June 2-3, 2000), at http://
www.iue.it/RSC/competition/papers.htm; see also Kartelle im Internet ankfindigen (interview with Dr. B6ge, Sfiddeutsche Zeitung Nr. 183, Aug. 10, 2000, p. 21).
99. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen §§ 4(2), 9(4), BGB1 1-2512 (1998).
100. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
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object of the agreement, but rather require a full analysis of the
actual conditions in which the agreement functions.' 1 In this
respect, the register, however, will not be helpful. The second
problem relates to the risk of distortion of enforcement priorities. Ideally, an enforcement authority should devote its resources as a matter of priority to the most serious infringements.
If the register were to lead to many complaints against less serious infringements, the need for the Commission and national
competition authorities to deal with these complaints, if only to
conclude that they do not deserve to be pursued, could constitute a drain on their scarce resources and thus have a perverse
effect on the overall effectiveness of ex post enforcement. Finally, even using the latest information technology, the administrative cost of the registration obligation is unlikely to be negligible.
The experience with the registration obligation for certain
joint purchasing agreements under German law, which only en2
tered into force onJanuary 1, 1999, with a transitional period,' 0
may however over the coming years show the above somewhat
skeptical assessment to be wrong. The proposed new regulation
is well adapted to this uncertainty, in that it does not itself introduce any registration obligation but rather empowers the Commission to do so, when considered appropriate, at a later time.
II. THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE COMMISSION AND THE
COMPETITION A UTHORITIES OF THE
MEMBER STATES
A. What the Proposed New Regulation Does Not, and What it Does
It is important from the outset to be clear about what exactly the proposed new regulation will change as to the respective roles of the Commission and the national competition authorities.
1. No Sharing of the Exemption Monopoly
The proposed reform is not about the Commission sharing
with the national authorities its current monopoly for granting
101. See Eur. Night Serv. et al. v. Comm'n, Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94, T388/94, [1998] E.C.R. 3196,
136.
102. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen §131(2), BGB1 1-2512 (1998).
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exemptions under Article 81(3) EC. Indeed the power to grant
individual exemptions is not reallocated but entirely removed.
In the proposed new system, no authority or court, European or
national, will have the competence to adopt constitutive positive
decisions which immunize an agreement and the parties to it
against attack by other competition authorities or in other
courts. Rejections of complaints or closures of ex officio proceedings by the Commission or by national competition authorities do not prevent findings of infringement by other authorities
or national courts. 10 3 As to national courts, the principle of res
judicata implies that a final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits of an action for failure to
execute a contract or for tort is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. It does not however prevent subsequent action by competition authorities or by other private parties.
The proposed new system thus does not involve any form of
multiple ex ante enforcement. Different authorities could either clear or block a proposed transaction, with all the ensuing
problems of multiple notifications, conflicting decisions, or forum shopping by undertakings seeking clearance from the laxest
authority.'0 4
2. Multiple Ex Post Enforcement
What the proposed new regulation will do is facilitate prosecution of infringements of Articles 81 and 82 by national competition authorities, i.e., multiple ex post enforcement.
Under Regulation No. 17, the competition authorities of
the Member States have only rarely prosecuted infringements of
Articles 81 or 82. This inactivity can be explained by two factors.
The first is that in only half of the Member States national law
103. The rejection of a complaint or the decision not to intervene may of course
have some persuasive value, if well reasoned. In the case of non-infringement decisions
adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 10, Article 16 of the proposed new
regulation also requires from national authorities and courts a degree of deference, as
they should endeavour to avoid conflict. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art.
16.
104. Because of such problems, ex ante enforcement tends to go together with a
monopoly of a single enforcement authority. The EC Merger Regulation and the application of Article 81(3) under Regulation No. 17 are examples.
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empowers national competition authorities to apply Articles
81 (1) and 82.105 As to those countries which have a national authority empowered to apply Community competition law, the
other factor explaining the lack of prosecution of infringements
of Article 81 (1) is that the Commission's power to grant exemptions under Article 81 (3), combined with Article 9 (3) of Regulation No. 17, discourages national authorities from taking up Article 81(1) cases.1 06 Indeed, whenever a national competition authority starts prosecuting an infringement of Article 81(1), the
undertakings concerned may decide to notify their agreement
or practice to the Commission, which, being under a legal obligation to act upon the notification, risks being forced to initiate
a procedure, thus taking away the national authority's competence. In its 1997 notice on cooperation between national competition authorities and itself, the Commission tried to reduce
this problem by announcing that "it considers itself justified in
not examining as a matter of priority" such "dilatory notifications. ' 107 This attempted solution is however not always easy to
implement, and its legality is yet to be tested in the Community
Courts.
The proposed new regulation removes both obstacles to
prosecution of infringements of Articles 81 and 82. As to the
first problem, Article 36 of the proposed new regulation obliges
Member States to designate the competition authorities responsible for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, and
to take the measures necessary to empower those authorities to
apply those Articles. As to the second problem, it disappears
with the notification system being abolished. It is true that Article 11 (6) of the proposed regulation still provides that the initiation by the Commission of proceedings for the adoption of a
decision relieves the competition authorities of the Member
States of their competence to apply Articles 81 and 82, but this
should not discourage action by the national authorities. Indeed, in almost four decades of application of Regulation No.
17, the Commission has, as far as I know, never knowingly and
105. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
106. See A.W. Kist, Coherence and Efficiency in the Decentralised Enforcement of
EC Competition Rules: Reflections on the White Paper on Modernisation, Paper
presented at the Fifth EUI Competition Law and Policy Workshop (June 2-3, 2000), at
http://www.iue.it/RSC/competition/papers.htm.
55-57.
107. Comm'n Communication, O.J. C 313/3 (1997),
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willingly removed a case from a national authority that wanted to
continue dealing with it, in the absence of a notification. As
there will be no notifications any more, and given that under
Article 11 (3) of the proposed new regulation the Commission
will be informed of all cases taken up by national authorities,
those authorities should thus not feel discouraged from prosecuting infringements of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
Prosecutions by national competition authorities of infringements of Articles 81 and 82 are also facilitated by two other
provisions in the proposed new regulation. Article 12(1) allows
for the exchange of all types of information between the Commission and national authorities and the use of this information
as evidence by the receiving authority. National authorities
could thus use evidence of infringements passed on to them by
the competition authorities of other Member States or by the
Commission. Currently, Article 20(1) of Regulation No. 17 prevents the national competition authorities from0 8 using as evidence information supplied by the Commission.1
In the same spirit, Article 21 (1) of the proposed new regulation creates the possibility for national competition authorities
to carry out any fact-finding measure under their national law on
behalf and for the account of the authorities of other Member
States. National competition authorities will thus be able to help
each other in collecting evidence of violations of Articles 81 and
82 EC.
B. Why Should National Authorities Prosecute Violations of
Articles 81 and 82?
The question could be asked why prosecution by national
competition authorities of violations of Articles 81 and 82 should
be encouraged. Why not leave this task exclusively to the Commission? Three reasons can be given:
The first reason is one of resources. By adding those of the
competition authorities of the Member States, substantially more
resources can be devoted to the detection and punishment of
108. Asociaci6n Espagfiola de Banca Privada et al., Case C-67/91, [1992] E.C.R.
4820. That this impossibility flows from Regulation No. 17 and not from a higher legal
norm is confirmed by Posthank v. Commission, T-353/94, [1996] E.C.R. 946 (holding
that national courts, whose relationship with the Commission is not regulated by Regulation No. 17, can fully use information provided to them by Commission).
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violations of Articles 81 and 82.109 Given the'limited resources of
the Commission, and the current inadequate level of effective
deterrence, this is certainly to be welcomed. This first reason is
however not a very profound one, as the same result could be
obtained by increasing the resources of the Commission's Directorate General for Competition.
The second reason is that for cases where the relevant markets are local, national, or regional, the competition authority or
authorities concerned are likely to have better access to the relevant information than the Commission.
The third and most profound reason is that multiple enforcement is likely to lead to more innovation in the interpretation and application of the law. Enforcement by several authorities is likely to be more creative, innovative, and adaptive to
change than enforcement by a monopolist authority.'n
C. Criteriafor Allocating Cases
In a system of multiple enforcement the question may arise:
who is best placed to investigate and prosecute a given case?
The Commission? A national competition authority? Or the
competition authorities of two or more Member States working
together?
Three sets of factors could determine the answer: the geographical scope of the relevant market and the location of the
evidence, the remedial and sanctioning powers of the different
authorities, and their available resources. For cases where the
relevant markets are local, national, or regional, the competition
authority or authorities concerned are likely to have better access to the relevant information than the Commission. Conversely, the Commission is better placed to deal with cases of a
European dimension. The location of evidence is also relevant,
as the competition authorities of the Member States normally
have investigatory powers only on their own territories. Remedial and sanctioning powers are relevant, as the authority that
deals with the case should be able to effectively order termina109. According to figures cited in the White Paper, in 1998 there were around
1222 officials responsible for investigating antitrust cases in the Member States as op44.
posed to 153 in Commission. See White Paper, supra note 8,
110. See E. Fox, Modernization: Efficiency, Dynamic Efficiency, and the Diffusion
of Competition Law, Paper presented at the Fifth EUI Competition Law and Policy
Workshop (June 2-3, 2000), at http://www.iue.it/RSC/competition/papers.htm.
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tion of the violation and to impose sufficiently high sanctions to
deter. Finally, the respective available resources of the different
authorities will obviously play a role.
These factors do not necessarily always point the same way
for the investigation and collection of evidence on the one hand
and the taking of a decision and imposition of sanctions on the
other hand. It may also happen that it becomes clear only at a
later stage in the proceedings that the authority, which initially
appeared well placed to deal with the case, is not the best placed
to bring it to an end.
Three new provisions in the proposed new regulation may
facilitate a rational allocation of cases: Article 21 (1), which creates the possibility for the competition authority of one Member
State to carry out fact-finding measures on behalf and for the
account of the authority of another Member State; Article 12,
which allows authorities to exchange all information and make
subsequent use of it, and thus makes possible not only the transfer of evidence but also the transfer of entire cases from one
authority to another; and Article 24(3), which provides that the
running of the limitation period for proceedings by the Commission is interrupted not only by certain investigatorial or procedural acts taken by the Commission itself, but also by such acts
taken by national competition authorities.1 1 1
Given that the question of who is best placed to deal with a
given case depends on a number of factors specific to each case,
the absence of any rule in the proposed new regulation as to
which authority could or should deal with which type of cases
should be approved. It is no doubt useful that the Commission
and the authorities of the Member States work out some arrangement between them, but such arrangement should remain
flexible and informal.
In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed new regulation, the Commission announces a notice on
cooperation between competition authorities that may contain
some general indications on the allocation of cases between the
Commission and the competition authorities of the Member
States. Similar indications can currently be found in the 1997
111. Currently, acts by national authorities can only interrupt the running of the
period if they are taken at the request of the Commission. See Council Regulation No.
2988/94, 0.J. L 319/1 (1974).
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Commission notice on cooperation between national competi112
tion authorities and the Commission.
D. Possible Problems with Multiple Ex Post Enforcement
Even if multiple enforcement is much less likely to cause
problems in a system of ex post enforcement than under ex ante
enforcement, 113 some possible problems should be considered.
1. Duplication
The first possible problem is duplication. It would certainly
be wrong to try and avoid any instance where two or more authorities pursue the same case. In quite a few situations it may
be desirable for more than one authority to take up the same
case, or for a second authority to take up a case after a first authority has abandoned it. Indeed, action by more than one authority at the same time may be necessary in order to conduct a
full investigation of all the facts, or in order to ensure adequate
remedies or sufficiently strong deterrence. It may also make
sense for a second authority to take up a case abandoned by a
first authority, if the second authority has reasons to believe that
it can do a betterjob than the first. It is precisely in this way that
some of the benefits of multiple enforcement in terms of more
effectiveness and innovation can be brought about.
Duplication is, however, to be avoided if it means that several authorities each do exactly the same job, without any added
value in terms of better enforcement results. One can be confident that in general the national competition authorities and
the Commission will be anxious to avoid such pointless duplication, as it would waste some of their scarce resources.
To be able to avoid duplication, however, each authority
needs to know which cases the other authorities are already dealing with. It must also be ensured that complainants cannot force
an authority to pursue a case that is already adequately being
dealt with, or has adequately been dealt with by another authority.
The proposed new regulation contains the necessary provisions in this respect: Article 11 (3) obliges national competition
authorities to inform the Commission about all proceedings be112. Comm'n Communication, supra note 88, O.J. C 313/3 (1997).
113. See supra note 104.
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ing opened. Combined with Article 12, which allows all exchange of information between the Commission and the national authorities, this provides the necessary legal basis for setting up an information system (intranet) through which all
national authorities and the Commission would be informed
about all the cases being dealt with by any authority in the network. As to the problem of complainants forcing authorities
into wasteful duplication, Article 13 of the proposed new regulation allows for both the suspension of a pending investigation
and the rejection of a complaint on the ground that another
authority is dealing or has dealt with the same case.
Finally, the old rule of Article 9(3) of Regulation No. 17,
maintained in Article 11 (6) of the proposed regulation, according to which national competition authorities lose their competence to deal with a case when the Commission opens an investigation, excludes duplication between the Commission and a national authority. It could also be used in those no doubt rare
cases where more than one national authority would want to
pursue the same case, without any possible added value in terms
of better enforcement results. If the national authorities concerned were not able to find between them a satisfactory arrangement as to who should take the case, the Commission
could step in and take the case itself.
2. Conflicting Decisions
Under the proposed new regulation no authority will take
any constitutive positive decisions, comparable to the exemption
decisions under Regulation No. 17 or the clearance decisions
under the E.C. Merger Regulation. Both the Commission and
the competition authorities of the Member States can either take
negative decisions (ordering termination of an infringement
and/or imposing sanctions) or decide not to take such negative
decision. In the latter case, the authority may close its file informally without any decision, or in the form of a decision stating
that there is no reason for it to intervene, or in the form of a
rejection of a complaint. The Commission may also adopt a
non-infringement decision pursuant to Article 10 of the proposed new regulation.
There is obviously no conflict between a negative decision
of one authority and the non-intervention of a second authority
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if the closure of the file or the rejection of'the complaint is
based on an assessment of the second authority's enforcement
priorities, rather than on a substantive judgment as to whether a
violation of Articles 81 or 82 exists. There is no conflict either
where the different authorities concerned did not have the same
facts in their possession.
Only if the decision not to intervene or the rejection of a
complaint is based on the authority's judgment, on the basis of
all the facts, that there is no substantive violation, could there be
said to be a conflict, meaning that two authorities have a different view as to the application of Articles 81 or 82 to the same
facts.
Such conflict is, however, not really problematic. There is
no question of undertakings being confronted with conflicting
legal orders which they cannot simultaneously respect, since decisions not to intervene, rejections of complaints, and non-infringement decisions do not contain any order. There is no
question either of the full effect (effet utile) of any decision being
undermined by the other one, again because decisions not to
intervene, rejections of complaints, and non-infringement decisions do not contain any order addressed to any undertaking or
person, and do not require any execution.
The mere fact that it becomes apparent that two authorities
have a different view as to the application of Articles 81 or 82
should not as such be regarded as problematic. Indeed, in a system where Articles 81 (as a whole) and 82 have direct effect,
neither the Commission nor the national competition authorities are supposed to possess the one and onlytrue understanding of the law. Reasonable people can disagree about the interpretation of the law. This is normal, and even desirable, to the
extent that it allows creativity and innovation and thus ultimately
a richer and better understanding of the law.' Excessive divergences will not be long lived, as in the end all cases can reach the
Court of Justice, which ensures overall consistency. The undertakings concerned have enough of an incentive to bring the necessary appeals for those cases that deserve to reach the Court of
Justice.
As I do not consider that conflicting decisions pose a problem in a system of ex post enforcement, I do not personally see
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any need for mechanisms to reduce the incidence of conflicting
decisions.
Those who are concerned about conflicting decisions will
however find that the proposed new regulation contains quite a
few provisions which would tend to reduce the incidence of conflicting decisions or could be used to that effect: Article 11 (3)
obliges national authorities to inform the Commission about all
cases they deal with, and Article 11 (4) provides for a mandatory
consultation of the Commission on all envisaged negative decisions. Article 12(1) makes it possible for this information and
consultation to involve all other national authorities. Under Article 11 (6), the Commission can withdraw a case from a national
authority, and according to Article 16 the competition authorities of the Member States shall use every effort to avoid conflict
with Commission decisions. These provisions, which I believe
are justified largely for other reasons, namely the avoidance of
duplication and of national bias, could be used by the Commission so as to minimize or even exclude all incidences of conflicting decisions. I believe that such ambition would be unwise, not
only because there is no need to do this, but also because it
would detract Commission resources from other work.
3. National Bias
A third possible problem with multiple enforcement relates
to the risk of national bias. I have no reason to suspect that the
competition authorities of the fifteen Member States would not
be sufficiently independent or professional to avoid bias in favour of national interests. The issue should however be considered, if only because, even in the absence of any real national
bias, there may be a problem of perceptions. In particular, undertakings or persons unhappy with a decision of a competition
authority of another Member State may be led to believe that
they were the victims of national bias.
One could distinguish two situations of national bias. The
first would be where the authority of a Member State is excessively severe in that it wrongly prohibits or punishes, at the request of a national complainant, the behaviour of a foreign undertaking, for instance aggressive competition on the merits by a
foreign dominant undertaking, harming less efficient national
competitors. The second situation would be where the authority
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of a Member State is excessively lax in that it refuses to act upon
complaints by foreigners against violations committed by domestic undertakings, for instance complaints by foreign entrants
about foreclosure of distribution channels by the domestic incumbent.
The second situation is less of a problem, because the foreign complainants always have the alternative to bring their complaint before the Commission, national courts, or possibly the
competition authority of another Member State. The first situation is much more problematic. The proposed new regulation
adequately addresses the issue, however, in that Article 11 (4)
obliges national competition authorities to consult the Commission before adopting a negative decision, with the possibility for
the Commission to take away the case from the national authority by application of Article 11 (6). Even if it is unlikely that the
Commission will often, or ever, have to use this mechanism, its
presence will have a preventive effect, to the extent necessary, as
well as reassure against perceptions of national bias.
At a deeper level, the proposed new regulation, with its potential of much closer and more intensive exchange and cooperation within a network of national competition authorities and
the Commission, tends to reduce the risk of national bias. Indeed, if there exists a problem of bias in favour of national interests, it must be because the competition authorities of the Member States would each be accountable or feel accountable to narrowly domestic constituents." 4 By making all national
competition authorities and the Commission act in close cooperation, as Article 11(1) envisages, the proposed new regulation
will tend, over time, to make national authorities feel accountable towards the other authorities in the network, and susceptible
to their peer pressure, which will reduce any risk of national
bias." 5
4. Forum Shopping
The fourth and last possible problem with multiple enforcement is forum shopping. Under ex ante enforcement forum
114. See P. Mavroidis & D. Neven, The White Paper: A Whiter Shade of Pale. Of
Interest and Interests, Paper presented at the Fifth EUI Competition Law and Policy
Workshop (June 2-3, 2000), at http://www.iue.it/RSC/competition/papers.htm.
115. See G. Majone, The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation, 38 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 273, 296-98 (2000).
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shopping can be a very serious problem indeed, as undertakings
could try to have their proposed operation cleared by the most
lax authority. There is no such risk under multiple ex post enforcement. The only possible forum shopping under ex post enforcement is by complainants who would tend to select the authority most likely to act upon their complaint, or try a second
chance with another authority if their complaint has been rejected by a first authority.
Such forum shopping is very often not problematic at all.
Indeed, it is desirable that complainants carefully select the authority best suited to deal with their complaint. There is nothing
wrong either with an unsuccessful complainant trying again with
a second authority that is willing and able to deliver a better enforcement result than the first.
Forum shopping appears only problematic either if it leads
to wasteful duplication or if it exploits possible national bias. As
explained above,"l 6 the proposed new regulation adequately addresses these problems.
IV. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS AND
NATIONAL COURTS
A. The Role of Private Complainants in Public Enforcement
Private parties harmed by violations of Articles 81 or 82 EC
can play a double role in the enforcement of these prohibitions.
They can themselves sue for damages or injunctive relief in the
national courts. They can also instigate public enforcement by
lodging complaints with the Commission or national competition authorities.
As to the role of complainants before the Commission, the
proposed new regulation does not contain anything new. Article
7(2) merely repeats the basic rule currently laid down in Article
3 of Regulation No. 17, that any natural or legal person who can
show a legitimate interest can lodge a complaint requesting the
Commission to order termination of an infringement. 17 According to Article 34(b) of the proposed new regulation, the
Commission in a further implementing regulation can deter116. See supra Parts II.D.1 & 3.
117. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 7(2).
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In the White Paper the Commismine more detailed rules.'
sion proposed to submit itself to an obligation to inform the
complainant within a time limit of four months as to'whether it
intends to take action on the complaint." 9 The Commission also
announced the publication of guidelines clarifying the concept
of sufficient Community interest, on the basis of which it determines its enforcement priorities, so as to guide complainants'
choice of the forum in which to pursue their complaint. 2 '
The proposed new regulation does not regulate the position
of complainants before the competition authorities of the Member States, this matter being left to national law. The one exception is Article 13 which allows national competition authorities
to suspend their proceedings or to reject a complaint on the basis that the same agreement or practice is being dealt with or has
already been dealt with by the competition authority of another
Member State or by the Commission.1 2 ' As explained above,12 2
this rule, which also applies to the Commission, serves to avoid
wasteful duplication.
B. PrivateEnforcement and the Role of National Courts: What the
Proposed New Regulation will not Change, and What it
Will Change
1. Impact on Private Enforcement and on
Contractual Litigation
Private enforcement of the prohibitions in Articles 81 and
82 in the strict sense, meaning actions for damages or for injunctive relief being brought in national court by third parties
harmed by anticompetitive agreements or practices, is quite uncommon in Europe, certainly much less common than in the
United States.
By abolishing the notification system and the exclusive competence for the Commission to apply Article 81(3), the proposed
new regulation removes an obstacle for private enforcement of
Article 81, as it will no longer be possible to bring court proceedings in practice to a halt by lodging a notification with the Com118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 34(b).
120.
See White Paper, supra note 19, at
119.
Id. at
Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art 13.
See supra Part II.D.1.
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12 3

mission.
As the experience with Article 82 shows, however, the relative absence of private enforcement is due to other factors as
well. 1 24 These are partly cultural, related to a generally lower
level of litigeousness and a weaker competition culture, but also
legal, linked to the unavailability of class actions, contingency fee
arrangements, treble damages, or discovery procedures. The
proposed new regulation does not attempt to remove any of
these legal obstacles, which are part of national law.
If the proposed new regulation is thus unlikely to have a
major, immediate impact with regard to actions for damages or
for injunctive relief by third parties, it will certainly have important effects in the area of contractual litigation: When parties to
a contract fall out with each other, the interested party may invoke incompatibility with Articles 81 or 82 EC to stop execution
of the contract or to justify its earlier non-execution. Here the
proposed new regulation will have a double effect. The first effect is that it will no longer be possible to invoke Article 81 (2)
EC to void agreements which are restrictive of competition in
the meaning of Article 81 (1) but which fulfill the four redeeming conditions of Article 81(3). The second effect is that national courts will themselves apply the four conditions of Article
81(3).
2. Agreements that Fulfill the Conditions of Article 81(3) Will
No Longer Be Void
This first effect of the proposed new regulation results from
the abolition of the notification system and the move to a pure
system of ex post enforcement. It does not concern vertical
agreements and other agreements covered by Article 4(2) of
Regulation No. 17, since for those agreements the notification
system is not applicable any more since 18 June 1999.125 For
other types of agreements, however, the current situation is that
agreements that fall under Article 81(1) EC, that are not covered by a block exemption and that have not been earlier notified to the Commission, are void under Article 81(2), even if
they fulfill the four conditions of Article 81(3). Many agree100.
123. See White Paper, supra note 19,
124. See Ehlermann, supra note 30, at 553.
125. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

2001]"-

ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLES 81 AND 82

1705

ments appear to be in this situation.' 2 6 Under the proposed new
regulation, agreements falling under Article 81 (1) and not covered by a block exemption will only be void if the conditions of
Article 81(3) are not fulfilled.
This change is obviously to be welcomed, as the enforcement of the material rule laid down in Article 81 EC, namely the
prohibition on restrictive agreements without redeeming virtue,
cannot possibly be served by rendering agreements that do not
violate this prohibition unenforceable.
3. National Courts Will be Able to Apply the Four Conditions
of Article 81(3) Themselves
Under Regulation No. 17, national courts cannot themselves apply the four conditions of Article 81(3). Even in the
case of vertical agreements and other types of agreements covered by Article 4(2) of Regulation No. 17, for which the notification system is not applicable any more, national courts which are
called upon to apply Article 81 (1), by virtue of its direct effect,
cannot themselves apply Article 81(3). They instead have to suspend their proceedings and wait for a decision of the Commission on whether or not the four conditions of Article 81(3) are
met. Only if the conditions for the application of Article 81(3)
are clearly not satisfied and there is, consequently, scarcely any
risk of the Commission taking a different decision, may the national court continue the proceedings and rule on the agree1 27
ment in question.
The proposed new regulation will do away with this impossibility for national courts to apply themselves Article 81 (3): Article 6 provides that "national courts before which the prohibition
in Article 81 (1) of the Treaty is invoked shall also have jurisdiction to apply Article 81(3) .1128
This change is to be welcomed for several reasons. First, it is
manifestly more economical to have one single decision-maker
decide whether the same agreement falls under Article 81(1)
and fulfills the conditions of Article 81(3). Both assessments require knowledge of largely the same facts, and in substance both
126. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
127. See Delimitis, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 935,
128. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 6.

50.
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provisions are closely linked.1 2 1 Splitting the assessment between
the national court and the Commission slows down contractual
litigation, increases its overall cost, and increases the risk of inconsistencies.
Secondly, all the resources that the Commission has to
spend on making Article 81(3) assessments for the purposes of
resolving contractual disputes are necessarily diverted from its
other work. The Commission should rather spend these resources on the detection and punishment of the most serious
infringements, such as secret price fixing or market sharing. For
this task, the Commission is really needed, whereas the application of Article 81 (3) in a contractual dispute can be perfectly left
to the national courts.
Thirdly, entrusting national courts with the task of applying
Article 81(3) has the benefit of consolidating the interpretation
of Article 81(3) as a true rule of law. As already mentioned
above, 1"' this Treaty provision, read in isolation, could originally
have been read either as a true rule of law or as a discretionary
political tool. The case law and decisional practice of almost 40
years make it clear today that the first reading is the correct one.
The proposed new regulation has the merit of consolidating this
31
interpretation.1
4. No Declaratory Judgements
By giving national courts "before which the prohibition in
Article 81(1) is invoked" the competence "also" to apply Article
81(3), Article 6 of the proposed new regulation is designed to
exclude the possibility for the parties to the restrictive agreement to take the initiative and bring an action in national court
for a declaratory judgment, stating that the infringement does
not infringe Article 81.132 Indeed, such proceedings, which are
the judicial equivalent of the administrative notification system
being abolished, would be incompatible with the overall thrust
129. See Bosch v. Van Rijn, Case 13/61, [1962] E.C.R. 52 (describing the provisions
as "forming an indivisible whole").
130. See supra Part I.B.3.e.ii.
131. SeeJ. Burrichter, Application of Article 81(3) by National Courts - Remarks
from the Point of View of a Practitioner, Paper presented at the Fifth EUI Competition
Law and Policy Workshop (June 2-3, 2000), at http://www.iue.it/RSC/competition/
papers.htm.
132. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 6.
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of the proposed reform. 133
C. Possible Problems with the Application of Article 81(3) by
National Courts
If the benefits of allowing national courts to apply Article
81 (3) themselves are clear, some thought should be given to possible problems.
1. Complex Economic Assessments
The fact that the application of Article 81(3) may require
complex economic assessments should not be a problem. As already argued above,' 34 Article 81(3) is not different in this respect from Article 81(1), Article 82, or Article 86(2) EC, the application of which requires equally complex economic assessments to be carried out by national courts.13 5 National courts
also deal with many other problems and areas of law which are
not less complex or technical than the application of competition law, 13 6 where necessary with the help of experts.
Article 15(1) of the proposed new regulation confirms the
possibility, already currently existing under the Commission's
1993 Notice on cooperation between national courts and the
Commission, 137 recently approved by the Court of Justice in Van
der Wal, 1 38 for national courts to call upon the Commission as a
legal or economic expert. Where national law provides for this
possibility, national courts may also seek advice from national
competition authorities. Especially where the relevant markets
are national or local, national competition authorities may actually be better placed to help.
2. Forum Shopping
There is nothing about Articles 81 and 82 EC, or Article
81(3) in particular, that would suggest there to be more of a
133. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
135. See cases cited supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing Article
81(1)); Bronner v. Mediaprint, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 7819 (discussing Article
82). As to Article 86(2), see, e.g., Corbeau, Case C-320/91, [1993] E.C.R. 2563.
136. See Ehlermann, supra note 19, at 585.
137. Commission Communication, O.J. C 39/5 (1993).
138. Netherlands v. Commission, Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P, [2000] E.C.R.
47,
20-25.
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problem with forum shopping for these provisions than with regard to other areas of law. The existing general rules, in particular the 1978 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,' 3 9
should be sufficient. 140
3. Inconsistent Judgements
Will the application of Article 81(3) by many national courts
instead of solely the Commission lead to unacceptably more inconsistency in the application of that provision? I do not think
SO.
On the one hand, a monopoly does not necessarily guarantee its consistent use. The Commission's few formal exemption
decisions may on the whole be consistent, but it is impossible to
know whether the same could be said about the much more numerous comfort letters, that are not published and, in general,
hardly, if at all reasoned, and which, because they are not acts of
the Commission, but only of its services, are not subject to the
same quality and consistency controls.1 4 '
On the other hand, national courts have been applying Articles 81 (1) and 82 EC already, without particular problems of inconsistency. Indeed, in virtually all areas other than competition, EC law is applied by the many national courts. 14 2 The Court
of Justice ensures the uniform application of EC law, mainly via
the mechanism of requests by national courts for preliminary
rulings. There is nothing about Articles 81 and 82 EC, or Article
81(3) in particular, which would suggest a greater threat of inconsistency than in other areas of EC law. 4 '
Anyway, under the proposed new system there will be more
139. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, J.O. L 299/32 (1972), amended by O.J. L 304/77 (1978),
amended by 0.J. L 388/1 (1982), amended by 0.J. L 285/1 (1989) [hereinafter Brussels
Convention); see also Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation, 0.J. C 376 E/1
(1999):
140. See M. Siragusa, Modernization of EC Competition Law: Risks of Inconsistency and Forum Shopping, Paper presented at the Fifth EUI Competition Law and
Policy Workshop (June 2-3, 2000), at http://www.iue.it/RSC/competition/papers.htm.
141. There is, for instance, no obligatory consultation of the Commission's Legal
Service, nor consultation of the Advisory Committee.
142. See Ehlermann, supra note 30, at 575-577.
143. See supra Part I.B.3.e.i (explaining that the situation was different for Article
81 at the time Regulation No. 17 was adopted, because of the novelty of the prohibition
on restrictive agreements in Europe at that time).
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instruments available for ensuring consistency than in other areas of EC law. First, guidelines or notices such as the recent
guidelines on vertical restraints tend to reduce inconsistency in
that they facilitate national courts' access to available information about the law.' 4 4
Secondly, Article 15 (3) of the proposed new regulation provides for a right for the Commission (as well as national competition authorities within their own Member States) to submit written or oral observations to national courts in relation to cases in
which questions of interpretation of Articles 81 or 82 arise. As is
apparent from Article 15(2), which provides for the Commission
to receive copies of judgments of national courts applying Artithe Commission could in particular use this
cles 81 or 82,'
power to intervene as amicus curiae at the stage of an appeal
against a judgment of a lower national court, which in the Commission's view would contain an erroneous application of Articles 81 and 82.146
The Commission's observations would obviously not be
binding for the national court. The mechanism does not therefore endanger the independence of the national court. In fact
something very similar already exists at the level of the Court of
Justice when it decides upon requests for preliminary rulings
from national courts. The Commission receives a copy of each
such request and has the right to submit observations before the
Court of Justice.' 4 7 Article 15(3) only adds a possibility for the
Commission to submit its observations directly to the national
court even before the latter makes a request for a preliminary
ruling to the Court of Justice. In some cases this could arguably
be an efficient shortcut.
The instances in which there will be a real need in terms of
ensuring consistency that would justify the Commission spending resources to intervene as amicus curiae before a national
court will in all likelihood be rare. The text of the proposed
Article 15(3) makes it certainly clear that the Commission can
only make use of this power "for reasons of the Community pub144. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
145. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 15(2).
146. It is not proposed that the Commission could itself lodge the appeal. This
could as usual only be done by the party concerned.
147. Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Community, art. 20, 298
U.N.T.S. 147, as amended by Council Decision 88/591, OJ. C 215/1 (Aug. 21, 1989).
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lic interest" and "on its own initiative," thus not at the request of
the parties before the national court.14 That the undertakings
concerned have no right to make the Commission intervene as
amicus curiae is essential to avoid a distortion of the Commission's work priorities similar to the one existing under the current notification and exemption system.
Finally, Article 16 also tends to reduce the risk of incoherent or inconsistent application of Articles 81 and 82. It provides
that, "in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty and the principle of the uniform application of Community law," national
courts, as well as national competition authorities, "shall use
every effort to avoid any decision that conflicts with decisions
adopted by the Commission."149

In Delimitis, the Court of Justice said that "conflicting decisions would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty and
must, therefore, be avoided when national courts give decisions
on agreements or practices which may subsequently be the subject of a decision by the Commission."'150 It cannot, however, be
deduced from this statement that national courts would have an
obligation to avoid conflict with Commission decisions, certainly
not in the context of the proposed new regulation. First, it
should be noted that the Court carefully used a passive formula,
saying that conflicting decisions must be avoided, but not saying
that national courts have an obligation to avoid conflicts. Indeed, in the rest of the judgment, the Court only says that a national court "may decide to stay the proceedings," that "[a] stay
of proceedings or the adoption of interim measures should also
be envisaged," "that it is always open to a national court ...

to

seek information from the Commission" and that "the national
court may in any event ... make a reference to the Court for a

preliminary ruling, '1 5 1 thus carefully avoiding imposing on the
national court either an obligation to follow a definite course of
action or any absolute obligation to avoid conflict. Second, the
whole of the Court's reasoning starts from and is based on an
analysis of the division of competence as laid down in Regulation
148. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining that the national court
can always ask the Commission for expert advice on the basis of Article 15(1) of the
proposed new regulation).
149. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 16.
150. Delimitis v. Henniger Brau, Case C-234/89, E.C.R. 1-992 (1991), at 47.
52-54.
151. Id. at
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No. 17, characterised by the Commission's exclusive competence
to apply Article 81(3).152 Indeed, the question in Delimitis was
how to reconcile the national courts' competence to apply Article 81 (1) with the Commission's exclusive power to apply Article
81 (3). This problem will not exist any more under the proposed
new regulation.
By virtue of Articles 1 and 6 of the proposed new regulation,
the whole of Article 81 will become directly applicable by national courts. In such context, an absolute obligation for national courts to avoid conflict with Commission decisions, even if
these have not or not yet been confirmed by the Court of Justice, '5 3 would, I believe, be incompatible with fundamental principles ofjudicial independence and access to court.15 4 The Commission's proposal on the contrary appears compatible with
these principles in that it only requires national courts to give
deference to the Commission's decisions without being bound.
V. SANCTIONS
As to the types and nature of sanctions, the proposed new
regulation does not depart very much from the current Regulation No. 17. A few points may, however, be mentioned.
A. Fines
1. Only Pecuniary Sanctions Imposed on Undertakings
Under Regulation No. 17, the Commission can only impose
fines for violation of Articles 81 and 82 EC on undertakings.1 5 5
Apart from the special case where the undertaking coincides
with a natural person (a single trader or professional who has
not incorporated his or her business), there is no possibility at
Community level to impose sanctions, be it fines or imprisonment, on the individual actors who initiated or executed the in44-47.
152. Id. at
153. On the contrary, it can be argued that the finding of an infringement by the
Commission in a decision confirmed by the Court of Justice could not be subsequently
put into question before a national court. See Iberian UK Limited v. BPB Industries
Ltd., [1996] 2 CMLR 601.
154. Contra E. Paulis, Coherent Application of EC Competition Law in a System of
Parallel Competences, Paper presented at the Fifth EUI Competition Law and Policy
Workshop (June 2-3, 2000), at http://www.iue.it/RSC/competition/papers.htm.
155. See W. Wils, The Undertaking as Subject of EC Competition Law and the Imputation
of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons, 25 E.L. REv. 99 (2000).
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The proposed new regulation does not alter this sitfringement.
56
1
uation.
Member States can provide in their national law for personal fines or imprisonment in case of violation of Articles 81
and 82 EC. This is confirmed by Article 5 of the proposed new
regulation, which allows national competition authorities to impose fines "or any other penalty provided for in their national
law." ' 57 Article 12(2) does, however, limit the use of information
obtained from the Commission or competition authorities of
other Member States under Article 12 (1) to proceedings leading
to financial penalties.
2. The Criminal Law Nature of Fines
Article 22 (5) of the proposed new regulation repeats Article
15(4) of Regulation No. 17, states that fining decisions taken by
the Commission "shall not be of a criminal law nature." 15' This
provision may have some relevance with regard to provisions of
national law that would attach any consequence to the qualification of procedures or sanctions as "criminal."
It is not, however, decisive with regard to the question
whether proceedings based on Regulation No. 17 or the proposed new regulation relate to "the determination of a criminal
charge" in the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention
of Human Rights. Indeed, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the indications furnished by domestic law as to the criminal nature of the offence "have only a
relative value," the notion of "criminal" as conceived of under
156. From the perspective of effective deterrence, this appears regrettable; see
supra note 31. Introduction of prison sanctions would however necessitate a more fundamental reform, in particular the transfer of the decisional power from the Commission to the Court of First Instance, transforming the Commission into a pure prosecutor, comparable to the US Department ofJustice. Such reform has been advocated (on
other grounds, related to efficiency and fundamental rights). See F. Montag, The Case
for a Radical Reform of the Infringement Procedure under Regulation 17, 8 ECLR 428 (1996);
Frank Montag, Problems and Possible Solutionsfrom a Practitioner'sPoint of View, 1998 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 157 (B. Hawk ed. 1999); see also D. Waelbroeck & D. Fosselard,

Should the Decision-MakingPower in EC Antitrust Procedures be left to an Independent Judge?The Impact of the European Convention of Human Rights on EC Antitrust Procedures, 14 Y.B.
EUR. L. 111 (1994).
157. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 5.
158. The regulation does not in any way prevent Member States from providing in
national law for proceedings or sanctions "of a criminal law nature" imposed by national authorities.
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'
Article 6 ECHR being "autonomous."159

For Article 6 to apply in virtue of the words "criminal
charge," "it suffices that the offence in question should by its
nature be "criminal" from the point of view of the Convention,"
because it relates to "a general rule, whose purpose is both deterrent and punitive," "or should have made the person concerned
liable to a sanction which, in its nature and degree of severity,
belongs in general to the 'criminal' sphere."' 60 As I have argued
in detail elsewhere, 61 it appears difficult, if not impossible, to
deny that the application of the criteria set out in the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights leads to the conclusion
that proceedings based on Regulation No. 17 (or the proposed
new regulation), leading to decisions in which the Commission
finds violation of Articles 81 or 82 EC, orders their termination
of a criminal
and imposes fines relate to "the determination
16 2
charge" in the meaning of Article 6 ECHR.
3. The Maximum Amount Of Fines
The proposed new regulation does not alter the ceiling of
10% of annual turnover for fines for infringements of Articles 81
and 82.163 Article 22(1) does however raise the ceiling for fines
for obstruction of investigations to 1% of annual turnover, in
line with Article 47 of the ECSC Treaty.
4. Publication of Fining Decisions
Article 31 of the proposed regulation departs from Article
[ 52, 50.
159. Oztfirk v Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, A/73 (1984),
55; Bendenoun v
160. Lutz v Germany, 123 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, A/123 (1987),
47.
France, 284 Eur. Ct. H.R.4, A/284 (1994),
161. W. Wils, La compatibilit des procddures communautaires en matire de concurrence
avec la Convention europenne des droits de l'homme, 32 CAHIER DE DROITS EUROPkEN 329
(1996).
162. See also K. Lenaerts & J. Vanhamme, ProceduralRights of PrivateParties in the
Community Administrative Process, 34 C.M.L. REv. 531, 557 (1997); Rh6ne-Poulenc v
Comm'n, Case T-1/89, 1991 E.C.R. II 867, 885 (opinion of AG Vesterdorf); Baus31 (opinion of AG
tahlgewebe v Comm'n, Case C-185/95 P, 1998 E.C.R. I 8422,
Lger); Hfils v Comm'n, Case C-199/92 P, 1999 E.C.R. I 4383 (C.J.), 1 149-150.
163. In its comments of September 30, 1999 on the White Paper, the OECD Competition Law and Policy Division said that "it is somewhat disappointing that the White
Paper does not propose any increase in fines for substantive offences . . . It is quite
possible that fines limited to 10% of one year's turnover, are already inadequate to
deter the more harmful types of horizontal agreements." see also W. Wils, E.C. Competition Fines: To Deter or Not to Deter, 15 Y.B. EUR. L. 17, 40-43 (1995).
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21(2) of Regulation No. 17 by expressly providing that the publication of Commission decisions should in particular specify the
penalties imposed. 164 In the past some undertakings have (unsuccessfully) tried to dissuade the Commission from publishing
the amount of the fine imposed on them, with the argument
that the exact amount would constitute a business secret. It is
clear that for fines to function as a deterrent, they should be
given full publicity.
B. Remedies
1. Termination Orders
Article 7 of the proposed new regulation departs from Article 3(1) of Regulation No. 17 in that it provides that, when ordering termination of an infringement of Articles 81 or 82, the
Commission "may impose [on the undertakings concerned] any
obligations necessary, including remedies of a structural nature. '"165 This should allow the Commission to order the breakup of an undertaking where this is necessary to bring to an end
recent expersistent abuse of a dominant position, following the
16 6
ample of the Microsoft case in the United States.
2. Consent Decisions
Article 9 of the proposed new regulation provides that
"where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring
that an infringement be brought to an end and the undertaking
concerned offer commitments such as to meet the Commission's
objections, the Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the undertakings."1 6' 7 Articles 9(2) and
9(3) add that "irrespective of whether or not there has been or
still is an infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty,
such a decision shall terminate the proceedings." The Commission may reopen the proceedings only where there has been a
material change in any of the facts on which the decision was
based, where the undertakings concerned act contrary to their
164. As is apparent from the tile of Chapter VI of the proposed new regulation,
"penalties" cover fines and periodic penalty payments.
165. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art 7.
166. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp.2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000).
167. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 9.
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commitments, or where the decision was based on incomplete,
incorrect, or misleading information.
This new type of decision, inspired by the American consent
decree, can be justified as an instrument to save enforcement
costs in those cases where the (perceived) competition problem
that made the Commission open its investigation can be solved
by the commitments offered by the undertakings concerned, or
at least reduced to such an extent that the case would no longer
have a sufficient Community interest to justify further attention
by the Commission, without a strong need to deter similar infringements through the imposition of fines.1 6 The settlement
can then save the costs that the Commission, the undertakings
concerned, and the Community Courts would bear, if a decision
finding an infringement were adopted by the Commission and
subsequently appealed before the Community Courts.
As the consent decision would leave open the question of
whether there was an infringement of Articles 81 or 82 EC in the
first place, the undertakings concerned could not seek its annulment by the Court of First Instance on the ground that no infringement existed. The decision being based on consent, duress, or undue influence could however be possible grounds for
annulment. The mere fact that the undertakings concerned
risked becoming the addressee of a negative decision adopted by
the Commission would obviously not suffice to vitiate consent.
As the consent decision would leave open equally the question whether an infringement of Articles 81 or 82 subsists notwithstanding the commitments, it would not protect the undertakings concerned against attack by national competition au169
thorities or in national courts.
Compliance with the commitments made binding in the
consent decision could be enforced by third parties in national
courts, and by the Commission with the fines and periodic penalty payments provided for in Articles 22(2) (c) and 23(1) (c) of
the proposed regulation. 170 Absence of an infringement of Arti168. The proposed Article 9 does not allow for fines to be paid as part of the

consent settlement. Proposed New Regulation, supra note 2, art. 9.
169. In application of Article 11 (4) of the proposed new regulation, national competition authorities would, however, have to consult the Commission before adopting a
negative decision.
170. This is indeed the main novelty of the proposed new provision as compared
to Regulation No. 17. Under Regulation No. 17, the Commission can equally settle a
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cles 81 and 82 EC would not be valid grounds for defence. Nor
would duress or undue influence be valid grounds for defence, if
no application for annulment has been brought against the consent decision on those grounds within the two month period
provided for in Article 230 EC.
CONCLUSION
The enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC should ideally be
designed in such a way that each of the available actors, being
the Commission, the competition authorities of the Member
States, the undertakings and their counsel, and the national and
Community courts, fulfils the tasks corresponding to its comparative advantage, i.e., the tasks for which it is best placed, given
the different tasks to be fulfilled, and given its competences and
resources as compared to those of the other actors.
The Commission's comparative advantage lies in the prosecution and punishment of the most serious violations of Articles
81 and 82, such as secret price or market sharing cartels, more
specifically those of a Community dimension. The comparative
advantage of the national competition authorities lies equally in
the prosecution and punishment of serious infringements,
rather than those of a local, national, or regional dimension.
The undertakings and their legal advisors are best placed to
make the advance assessment of the legality of proposed business actions. National courts are best placed to resolve contractual disputes, and the Court of Justice, together with the Court
of First Instance and in cooperation with the national courts, are
best placed to provide authoritative interpretations of the law.
Compared to the current situation under Regulation No.
17, the Commission's proposal for a new regulation has the
merit of allowing each actor to fulfil precisely the task corresponding to its comparative advantage. The result should be a
more effective enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC, at a lower
cost. Undertakings will save the cost of notifying their agreements to the Commission, or will no longer have to pay the alternative price of their agreements not being enforceable, even if
they fulfil the conditions of Article 81(3). Contractual litigation
will be facilitated by national courts being able to apply Article
case. See, e.g., SWIFt, O.J.C 335/3 (1997). No specific sanctions are attached in case of
non-respect of the commitments.
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81(3). The competition authorities of the Member States will no
longer be handicapped in their application of Community competition law by the Commission's exemption monopoly. The
Commission will be free to devote more of its resources to its
core task of detecting and punishing the most serious antitrust
violations, in particular Community-wide cartels, thus raising deterrence.
Whether the latter potential will be fully realized, will in
part depend on how the Commission makes use of the new regulation, assuming that it is adopted by the Council. Indeed, the
proposed regulation also contains the potential for the Commission to continue spending many of its resources, or spend even
more than its current resources on adopting non-infringement
decisions, issuing reasoned opinions and intervening in cases
handled by national competition authorities and national courts.
There is, however, no reason to doubt that the Commission will
have the wisdom to use the new regulation in such a way that its
full potential for a more effective enforcement of the prohibitions laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC will be realized. Indeed,
more effective enforcement is precisely what the proposed reform is about.

